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ABSTRACT 
Northern Uganda has suffered a violent civil conflict between the Government of Uganda 
and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), for over two decades.  The conflict has resulted 
in over 1.6 million internally displaced persons within Uganda, as well as over 66,000 
children abducted and forced into soldiering.  In 2006, the LRA could no longer sustain 
the fight against the Government of Uganda and fled to into Southern Sudan.  Northern 
Uganda shifted from a combat zone into an extremely complex post conflict 
environment.   The Government of Uganda began reconstruction efforts to piece the 
region back together with a series of programs, projects and donors.  Central to the 
overall efforts towards security and development was the Ugandan military, the UPDF.   
The UPDF conducted a series of civil-military operations to assist in reconstruction and 
post conflict operations within its own borders.  Using the Northern Uganda post conflict 
environment, this study will explore the impact of civil-military operations within the 
overall of post conflict operations, to include stability and counterinsurgency operations.   
Through the Ugandan example, this study will determine the salience of civil military 
operations in post conflict operations as both a force multiplier and a means to gain 
popular support for the government. 
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A.  NORTHERN UGANDA’S POST CONFLICT LANDSCAPE  
For over two decades, from 1986 to 2006, Northern Uganda suffered a violent 
civil conflict. After a series of insurgencies emerged from the northern Acholiland in the 
late 1980s, one rebel group finally absorbed all the remaining movements. The Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA), established in 1988 and led by Joseph Kony, waged war against 
the government of Uganda.1  Joseph Kony and LRA are one in the same.  Without 
Kony’s charismatic leadership, the movement could not have grown or survived as long 
as it has.  Over two decades of fighting on Ugandan soil ended in 2006, after the LRA 
lost external support from Sudan and the Ugandan Army waged massive offensive 
operations in both Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda.  The LRA fled Northern 
Uganda and sought refuge in Southern Sudan; the insurgency was weakened but still 
intact. Despite its exit from Uganda, the LRA still remains active in the region, executing 
attacks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Central African Republic 
(CAR), and South Sudan.  Though Joseph Kony and his army have not been able to 
physically return to Uganda since 2006, their rebellion left much destruction and misery 
in its wake.   
During the conflict, most of the fighting took place in Northern Uganda, as the 
Uganda’s People Defense Force (UPDF) executed its own brutal counterinsurgency 
against the LRA. The war between Kony and the UPDF left the region devastated. The 
International Crisis Group estimates that over 2 million people have been displaced since 
the conflict began.  Also, the LRA has abducted over 66,000 children and made atrocious 
use of many as child soldiers.2  In addition to the missing children and millions of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), Northern Uganda was left with a shattered economy 
                                                 
1 Branch, A. “Exploring the Roots of the LRA Violence: Political Crisis and Ethnic Politics in 
Acholiland.” Chap. 1, In The Lord’s Resistance Army Myth and Reality , edited by Allen, T. and 
Vlassenroot, K., 25. New York: Zed Books, 2010. 
2 Finnstrom, S. “Wars of the Past and War in the Present: The Lord’s Resistance Movement/Army in 
Uganda.” Journal of International African Institute 76, no. No. 2 (2006): 200.  
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and an entire population that felt marginalized and abused by both its government and the 
rebellion.3  With the LRA problem pushed outside its borders, the government of Uganda 
was left to face the challenges of rebuilding a war torn region.   
Northern Uganda shifted from a combat zone and currently presents itself as a 
complex post conflict environment.  Both sides of the conflict committed egregious acts 
against the civilian population in the north.4  The people of Northern Uganda were caught 
between the horrifying human rights violations of Joseph Kony and the brutal tactics of 
the Ugandan military for more than twenty-years. By the time the conflict ceased, the 
population was reluctant to return to their homes, or even believe that peace had come to 
their region.5  The government of Uganda and the international community took notice of 
the post conflict conditions in Northern Uganda.  Understanding the need to rebuild and 
develop the region, reconstruction efforts from the government and international agencies 
began piecing the region back together with a series of programs, projects and donors.  
Central to the overall efforts towards both security and development was the Ugandan 
military, the UPDF.  Especially during the early post-conflict phases of 2006, the UPDF 
was one of the few governmental entities with the ability to operate and provide 
humanitarian relief to the IDP camps and resettlements.  The UPDF continued to 
maintain a presence in the region as the government began to transition functions back to 
civil authorities such as an active police force.  The UPDF has over 1,600 soldiers 
deployed to the North to assist with vast complexity of post conflict issues, which include 
crime, land disputes, IDP resettlement, food security issues, and fear of the LRA 
returning.6  
                                                 
3 “Counter LRA Reporting and Analysis.” Collection of Multiple open source materials, Reports can 
be obtained through the OIC, Defense Resources Management Initiative (DRMI) Office of the Defense 
Attache U.S. Embassy Kampala, Uganda. Org E-mail: DRMIorg@gmail.com. 
4 Hopwood, Julian. “We can’t be Sure Who Killed U.S.: Memory and Memorialization in Post-
Conflict Northern Uganda (13–14).” International Center for Transitional Justice: Justice and 
Reconciliation Project (February 2011, 2011).  
5 Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., ed. The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality. New York: Zed 
Books, 2010. 
6 “Ugandan Human Rights Commission Annual Report: 2009–2010.” Uganda Human Rights 
Commission (2010).  http://www.uhrc.ug/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=111 
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Since 2006, the government of Uganda has shifted the use of its military from 
kinetic operations like actively hunting the LRA to a force that integrates the concept of 
non-kinetic concepts such as civil military operations (CMO) into its overall strategy in 
the north.   Because of the prevalence of civilians in any military operation, CMO has 
been integrated into various military operations, such as counterinsurgency (COIN), 
stability operations, peacekeeping operations and military operations other than war 
(MOOTW).  CMO has also been integrated in the various phases of warfare from shaping 
through transition.7   
Using CMO, the UPDF’s focus has become the population and not the LRA.  This 
shift is apparent in both the way the UPDF approached the post conflict environment in 
the north as well as the way it engaged in its final phases of counterinsurgency 
operations.  Northern Uganda poses a unique challenge for the UPDF as a post conflict 
environment in terms of both security and development. Though the LRA no longer bases 
in Northern Uganda, it is still an active armed group that has voiced its intent on 
returning to the country.  The UPDF therefore must address the LRA as a current and real 
threat, not only to Uganda, but the entire region.  
The UPDF’s integration of CMO is a means to address the LRA threat indirectly.  
The LRA emerged from a set of circumstances and core grievances felt by the people in 
the north.  The LRA exploited those grievances and conditions in order to create and 
grow an insurgency.  The LRA preyed on the situation of the Acholi population 
specifically.  CMO provides way for the UPDF, and the government, overall to address 
the needs and concerns in the North.  Because the LRA was a manifestation of the Acholi 
plight, the government must construct a means to gap the disconnect between the north 
and the central government in order to mitigate the risk of future uprisings.  Until the 
suffering and disparity in the north is met with projects, humanitarian assistance, security, 
and other CMO tactics the north will not be able to move past the conflict.  
Despite the fact the LRA has physically left Uganda, it haunts development and 
forward momentum.  As long as the LRA remains in existence, the people in Northern 
                                                 
7 JP 3–57”Civil-Military Operations.” Joint Publication 3–57 JP 3–57, (08 July 2008, 2008).  
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Uganda are hesitant to resettle and develop the region.8   In this vein, the LRA problem 
has only been exported to other countries in the region and can eventually disrupt security 
and stability throughout the Great Lakes region to include Uganda. Other security issues 
that threaten the reconstruction of the north are issues of land disputes with the 
resettlement of IDP’s, armed outlaws, cattle raiding in the Karamoja Region and food 
security.  The UPDF made efforts to handle these difficult post conflict situations through 
various CMO activities.  The UPDF’s use of CMO is not only a mechanism to counter 
the damages caused by the LRA, but also it is other way to approach other security issues 
that plague the region.  Despite these challenges, the north is slowly rebuilding itself from 
twenty years of conflict.  
The UPDF and its use of CMO activities are relatively new tools in the larger 
stability and counterinsurgency operations in Northern Uganda.  The UPDF’s shift to 
non-kinetic operations, better treatment of the north’s Acholi population, and civilian-
centric activities are all efforts to rebuild civil society and stability in Northern Uganda. 
This study will examine the impact of the UPDF’s civil military operations (CMO) 
within the overall of post conflict reconstruction strategy in Northern Uganda, to include 
stability and counterinsurgency operations.   It argues that the UPDF’s civil military 
operations have been instrumental in the post conflict reconstruction efforts in Northern 
Uganda through small and large infrastructure projects, the transition of civil authority, 
the protection of the population, the ability to provide basic services to the population and 
the overall coordination with other development partners.   
B. IS THERE A ROLE FOR THE MILITARY IN A NON-KINETIC 
ENVIRONMENT? 
In recent years, the concept of irregular warfare (IW) has become the framework 
for military operations.  Conventional interstate military to military engagements are on 
the decline, but intra-state conflicts and IW are on the rise.9   In intra-state conflicts, 
                                                 
8 Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., ed. The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality. New York: Zed 
Books, 2010.  
9 Fearon, J.D. & Latin, David. “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.” The American Political Science 
Review 97, no. 1 (Feb 2003, 2003): 75.  
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whether the military operations are full on Clausewitz-style warfare against an 
insurgency or conducting peacekeeping operations (PKO), there exists a local population 
that is affected by the fighting.  No matter where a conflict sits in the grand spectrum of 
violence, any military operation will ultimately involve a civilian population.10  No 
matter if the population is hostile, neutral or friendly, it can be a crucial source of 
information, provide support to either side of the conflict, and can affect the combatants 
that operate in the area.  Civilians have been and will always be a critical factor in every 
military operation.  CMO is a method in which a military engages the population and 
builds relationships.    
CMO is defined by the U.S. Joint Forces as “the activities of a commander to 
establish collaborative relationships among military forces … and the civilian populace in 
a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate overall military 
operations.”11 Other military organizations use the term Civil-Military Cooperation 
(CIMIC) to define the coordination of civilian and military units.12  The Joint Publication 
for Civil-Military Operations identifies CMO as a primary military tool that synchronizes 
military and nonmilitary instruments namely in support of stability, counterinsurgency, 
and other operations that deal with asymmetric threats or irregular warfare.13   The 
concept of integrating CMO-type operations into traditional military operations is not a 
new concept.  Major military powers such as the United States, Great Britain and France 
have recognized the salience of CMO since as early as the Second World War.14   
Though CMO is not a novel concept, the way it is integrated into the post conflict 
phase of operations is an area that needs be studied.  The increased frequency of civil 
conflicts has left many countries in ruins as they begin to rebuild themselves from the 
ashes of war.  This study seeks to answer the following questions: can the military that 
                                                 
10 Salmoni, B. and Holmes-Eber, P. Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and 
Applications. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008.  
11 JP 3–57”Civil-Military Operations.” Joint Publication 3–57 JP 3–57, (08 July 2008, 2008).  
12 Franke, Volker. “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations.” 
International Journal of Peace Studies 11, no. 2 (Winter 2006, 2006): 6.  
13 “Civil-Military Operations.” Joint Publication 3–57 JP 3–57, (08 July 2008, 2008).   
14 Fishel, J. T. Civil Military Operations in the New World. Westport, CT: Prager Publishers, 1997.  
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was once a force of destruction provide a critical role in reconstruction and the post 
conflict environment?  Does CMO have a pertinent after the conflict has ceased?  If so, 
then how can CMO be effectively integrated in a complex post conflict environment?  
The conflict in Northern Uganda provides a case with a classic insurgency in the sense 
that the LRA was an armed faction that wished to oust the current regime.  This 
insurgency created a conflict that lasted twenty-five years.  At the same time, the LRA 
provides unique circumstances for COIN strategists because it does not fall neatly into 
any insurgent category.15  Since the LRA physically relocated from Northern Uganda all 
major combat operations in the north have ceased, making it a post conflict area.  Also, 
the insurgency moved to a reliance on forced recruitment and does not use the population 
to support its cause, but instead conducts raids on the local population to sustain itself.  
The LRA no longer hides amongst the Acholi population in Northern Uganda, rather it 
lives in seclusion inside Garamba National Park in the eastern region of the DRC.   With 
the LRA exiled in Southern Sudan and the DRC, begs the question what is the point of 
CMO in Northern Uganda?  
C. CMO IN UGANDA 
The LRA’s ruthless approach of using violence against civilian populations left 
Northern Uganda devastated from decades of conflict. The LRA continues to conduct 
attacks and violent operations in CAR, DRC, and Southern Sudan.16  Their brutal 
methods of engagements changed little over the past twenty-five years.  Abducting 
children and terrorizing local populations with forced recruitments, rape, and robbery are 
all continuing tactics the LRA employs.  Fear of the LRA and mandatory relocation by 
the UPDF caused millions to be displaced from the north.17  Though the government of 
Uganda is working to move the IDPs back to their original homes, Gulu and other cities 
in the area are faced with numerous economic and humanitarian issues.  UNHCR reports 
                                                 
15 McCormick, Gordon. “People’s Wars.” Encyclopedia of Conflicts since WWII. New York: M.E. 
Sharp, Inc. 
16 “Counter LRA Reporting and Analysis.” Collection of Multiple open source materials, Reports can 
be obtained through the OIC, Defense Resources Management Initiative (DRMI) Office of the Defense 
Attache U.S. Embassy Kampala, Uganda. Org E-mail: DRMIorg@gmail.com. 
17 Ibid. 
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that there are still 370,000 IDPs unable to return home as of 2010.18   Civilians returning 
to the north face issues of rebuilding their lives, their society and recovering from the 
violence.  They are still vulnerable to the conditions that led to the initial insurgency.  
The LRA has devastated the Acholi in Northern Uganda. Between 500,000 to 
800,000 Acholi were moved into IDP camps, some estimate that was up to 80 percent of 
the entire Acholi population.19  At the same time, the UPDF has used harsh methods to 
counter the insurgency, further victimizing the area’s residents.  Throughout the early 
1990s and into the final military operations in 2006, there were numerous accusations of 
the UPDF committing as atrocities on its own people as had the LRA before them.20  
Robert Feldman specifically looks at why it took over twenty years to drive the LRA out 
of Uganda with the core leadership of the group still intact.  He views this timeline as a 
failure on the UPDF’s part and that the government of Uganda could have rid itself of the 
LRA problem much sooner.   Feldman concludes that the UPDF was not professional 
enough to handle its own population, suffering from a lack in training and coordination.  
The UPDF did not start off has a regular state army; it began as rebel movement called 
the National Resistance Army (NRA).  The force was young and not made up of 
professional soldiers at its inception.21  The UPDF’s heavy-handed tactics alienated the 
population.   While the population did not support Kony and his violence, they did not 
trust the government or its military.22   
Another issue, which permeates through the UPDF’s earlier COIN strategy, was 
the lack of civilian protection.23  The UPDF launched several operations with the specific 
                                                 
18 Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K., ed. The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality. New York: Zed 
Books, 2010.  
19 Dunn, Kevin. “Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army.” Review of African Political Economy 31, no. 
99 (March 2004, 2004): 139.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Tangri, Roger &. Mwenda, Andrew. “Military Corruption & Ugandan Politics since the Late 
1990s.” Review of African Political Economy 30, no. 98 (December 2003, 2003).  
22 Feldman, R. “Why Uganda has Failed to Defeat the Lord’s Resistance Army.” Defense & Security 
Analysis 24, no. 1 (March 2008, 2008): 45.  
23 Spiegel, J. and Atama, N. “Finishing the Fight Against the LRA.” Enough (2009).  
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intent to capture or kill Kony and completely annihilate the LRA.  The first major 
offensive was called Operation North, which launched in 1991. The second major 
counterinsurgency push was called Operation Iron Fist in 2006.  This was the last major 
kinetic operation that occurred on Ugandan soil.  The last major combat operation 
mounted against the LRA was Operation Lighting Thunder in 2008.  Operation Lighting 
Thunder was executed in Garamba National Park in DRC territory.  Each operation 
successfully killed hundreds of LRA soldiers, but failed to dismantle the entire 
movement. Kony stayed alive and with him, so did the LRA.  A major consequence of 
these named operations was that all led to severe reprisals from the LRA towards the 
civilian populations. Though the LRA suffered losses in these attacks and military 
analysts project the organization is in a desperate state, the LRA still has the capacity to 
conduct operations.  Each of these operations illustrates how the UPDF’s concentration 
was on a decisive military battlefield victory.  UPDF was not able to achieve its ultimate 
goal of eliminating the LRA threat in its entirety.  Not only has the LRA has survived the 
UPDF’s most intense kinetic efforts, but each time retaliated against unprotect civilian 
populations.24   
During the final stages of the war into the post conflict phase in Uganda, the 
UPDF changed its approach to counterinsurgency and stability operations.  With training 
from partners in the UN, International Red Cross Committee (ICRC), Canada, and the 
U.S., the UPDF sought to integrate concepts of CMO into its over arching strategy.  The 
UPDF partnered with other organizations conducted veterinary projects, refurbishments 
of infrastructure, and other traditional civil affairs type projects.  The UPDF has shown 
an interest in growing its CMO capability by establishing Civil Military Coordination 
Centers (CMCC) in conjunction with its CMO projects.  This study will provide an in 
depth analysis of the role of CMO in a non-kinetic environment as a tool for the UPDF 
and the implications of the UPDF conducting CMO operations within its own territory.  
                                                 
24 Perrot, S. “Northern Uganda: A Forgotten Conflict, again? the Impact of the Internationalization of 
the Resolution Process.” Chap. 10, In The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, edited by Allen, T. 
and Vlassenroot, K., 187. New York: Zed Books, 2010. 
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By examining how the UPDF uses CMO in a post conflict Northern Uganda, one can 
apply those lessons to other post conflict environments.    
D.  METHODOLOGY  
Because the major research question is how CMO is integrated into a post conflict 
environment, the methodology of an in depth case study of the UPDF will be used.  This 
study will have a multi-tiered research design.  First, it will examine literature on post 
conflict issues such as continued COIN operations, stability operations, and the 
humanitarian relief involved in the complex environment.   Next, a broad overview of 
CMO will be analyzed to establish the theoretical framework for the study.   Next, the 
UPDF CMO operations in Northern Uganda will be examined in detail.  Resources for 
CMO activities will include media coverage both local and international, after action 
reports from the UPDF or its partnered force, NGO reporting and UPDF military 
publications will be examined.  Using the resources mentioned, this study will determine 
what are the UPDF’s CMO goals in the north.  In the absence of UPDF published 
doctrine, primarily CMO principles of the U.S. military will fill the gaps.    
This thesis will be organized by first examining the complexities of a post conflict 
landscape.  The next chapter will thoroughly examine what are the CMO roles in a post 
conflict environment to include COIN and stability operations with their subsequent 
phases.  Once the framework is established then this study will take an in depth look at 
the Uganda case study.  When looking at Uganda, the LRA insurgency will be put into 
context by exploring the history of Ugandan insurgencies.  Since the LRA is a third 
generation insurgency, it is essential to examine the root causes of these uprisings.   
The next focus of the thesis will be specific to the development of the UPDF and 
its strategy both during and after the conflict.  This chapter will examine how the UPDF 
has approached the LRA problem in the past as well as current operations.  In this chapter 
the goals of the UPDF will be examined and it will be determined if the ends and the 
means match.  
 This organizational structure was chosen because it starts the audience with the 
larger question of the relationship of CMO in a complex post conflict environment and 
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then narrows into the Ugandan case study.  This thesis is about the application of CMO in 
a post conflict environment, using the UPDF’s conflict with the LRA as a vehicle to drive 
the study.  By using the Uganda post conflict environment, this study will explore the 
impact of CMO within the overall of post conflict reconstruction strategy, to include 
stability and counterinsurgency operations.   It seeks to prove that civil military 
operations are instrumental in the post conflict reconstruction efforts through the 
completion of infrastructure projects, the transition of civil authority, the protection of the 
population, the ability to provide basic services to the population and the overall 
coordination with other development partners.   
 11 
II.  THE HUMAN DIMENSION IN THE POST-CONFLICT 
ENVIRONMENT 
A.  MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE POST CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT 
The focus of this chapter is to examine the human dimension within the broad 
scope of military operations that can occur in a post conflict environment.   Though the 
physical environment can be demanding, it is the human dimension that will drive the 
complexity of the situation in a post-conflict environment.  Counterinsurgency operations 
(COIN), stability and reconstruction operations, and even humanitarian assistance (HA) 
can occur throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations to 
include non-combat environments.   COIN, stability operations and HA are the three 
specific types of military operations within a post conflict environment to be explored in 
this chapter, which will show that military doctrine and scholars alike point to the local 
population as the center of gravity in these three operations.   Studying the human 
dimension throughout post conflict operations will provide the framework for justifying 
the use of civil-military operations in post conflict environments.   
As mentioned in the previous chapter, intra-state conflicts are on the rise. As more 
and more states find themselves plagued with internal conflicts, these states will 
eventually have to contend with post-war issues.  Once combat operations cease, a 
military then has the complex duty of transitioning to a post conflict environment.  
According to William Flavin, the most difficult task for a military is to take broad 
political guidance and produce military objectives once kinetic operations have 
stopped.25   The Secretary General of the UN describes the complexity of post conflict 
objectives as follows:  
Actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and 
prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation.  Experience shows that the 
consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than 
purely diplomatic and military action, and that an integrated peace 
                                                 
25 Flavin, William. “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success.” Parameters 33, 
no. 3 (Autumn 2003, 2003): 99. 
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building effort is needed to address the various factors, which caused or 
are threatening to reignite a conflict.26   
 In the vastly complicated post-war environment, a military is tasked with providing a 
safe environment for the restoration of good governance and rule of law.27  The 
restoration of peace can come in the form of continued COIN, stability and reconstruction 
operations and HA.   By effectively understanding the human dynamics with those three 
types of operations, a military can be successful in the post conflict environment.  
B. COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS 
Prevailing conflict resolution theory asserts that in order to have successful 
conflict termination, one must first understand the nature of the conflict by analyzing the 
key issues that caused the conflict to emerge and have the potential to spur future 
problems.28  Those same concepts can be applied when examining COIN operations.  
COIN cannot be addressed until an insurgency and the nature of the conflict are explored.  
“Successful COIN operations require comprehensive knowledge of the [operational 
environment], including an understanding of the insurgents, [and] the scope of the 
insurgency...”29 By examining the complex dynamics of a conflict, the desire to influence 
and gain support from the population will emerge as a main focus for all the players.  The 
asymmetrical characteristics of an insurgency verse the state plays an important role in 
developing the human dimension within the conflict.  This is not to say that all rebellions 
are alike and only follow a particular set of rules.  However, the limitations of an 
insurgency at the onset of the conflict shape the way it engages a local population. These 
restrictive properties also affect the way a counterinsurgent force seeks to counteract the 
insurgents.  Through a discussion of excepted theories on insurgencies and COIN, one 
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28 Flavin, William. “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success.” Parameters 33, 
no. 3 (Autumn 2003, 2003): 103. 
29 Counterinsurgency Operations. Vol. JP 3–24 Joint Publications, 2009.  
 13 
will see that the main focus of both an insurgent or a counterinsurgent force is to win the 
support of the population that each side seeks political power over. 
1. The Making of an Insurgency 
Because of the nature of counterinsurgency operations, it cannot exist without an 
insurgency to fight.  The entire conflict is ignited and based on the actions of an 
insurgency attempting to seize power or change existing power structures while the 
counterinsurgency aims to maintain the status quo.30  At the onset, an insurgency 
movement has three distinct characteristics that define it and motivate its actions - size, 
capability/resources, and the need for popular support.  These characteristics drive the 
way an insurgency acts and how it integrates the population and other human dimensions 
in its strategy.  By studying these characteristics within an insurgency, one can derive the 
way in which insurgents engage both a counterinsurgency and a local population.  This 
study will use the following definition for an insurgency: “the organized used of 
subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change 
of a governing authority…” 31 By this definition, an insurgent group seeks a political 
goal to overthrow or change the state through violence. The political nature of an 
insurgent movement differentiates it from other forms of intrastate violence such as 
banditry or organized crime.  Though those other forms of violence may threaten state 
stability, the definition of an insurgency is as much about the use of violence as the intent 
of the activity. 
The political nature of an insurgency, along with its size, capacity and need for 
population support characterize the ways it uses violence. The first characteristic of 
interest when describing the mode of operation for an insurgency is the size of a 
rebellion. An insurgency starts as the smaller and weaker force; if a political movement 
were more powerful than its adversary then it would use its strength to overtly change the 
offending government.   In order to overcome its inherent weakness, an insurgency will 
                                                 
30  Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice. Westport, CI: Praeger Security 
International, 1964. 
31 Counterinsurgency Operations. Vol. JP 3–24 Joint Publications, 2009. (pI-1) 
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avoid any major or direct confrontations with counterinsurgent forces.  A small number 
of mobile insurgents can cause chaos and disorder within a larger area.  The methods for 
causing disorder and chaos are relatively cheap and easy to apply. An insurgency has an 
advantage in being small and fluid.32  If an insurgency’s actions are successful, it calls 
the government’s legitimacy into question in the eyes of its constituents- the local 
population. The counterinsurgency is forced to spend large amounts of money and 
resources restoring order and re-legitimizing the state’s authority.  While a 
counterinsurgency is typically tied to conventional constraints such as fixed installations, 
lines of communications and defending these critical vulnerabilities, an insurgent force 
has no key installation that it must stay and defend. It can always run and fight another 
day.33  In this way, an insurgent is able to capitalize on the fluid and mobile nature of his 
forces.   
The next characteristic of an insurgency is limited resources and capability.  
Knowing it is the smaller force in the conflict, an insurgency uses time and money to its 
advantage in a strategy of attrition in order to wear down its enemy.  Limited resources 
affect the way in which an insurgency fights.  An insurgency will engage in a long and 
protracted war in which the state’s will begins to erode in the face of lost legitimacy.  An 
insurgency can pace its use of guerilla warfare, subversion, and terrorism in such a way 
so that it expends minimal resources.  At the same time, to protect multiple fixed points, 
restore order and essentially police the local areas, a counterinsurgency effort must 
undertake massive costs and resources to fight a seemingly small and invisible force.  An 
insurgency only has to “not lose” rather than have a decisive military victory over the 
counterinsurgency.34   A rebel force uses the “death by 1,000 paper cuts” mentality to 
defeat the enemy.  
There are instances where an insurgency is able to garnish support from external 
sources and even secure natural resources within its area of control.  Access to resources 
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International, 1964. 
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can change the strategy of an insurgency, but the nature of an insurgency stays the same 
regardless of resource control. Belligerents tend to use whatever means are accessible to 
them to finance or profit from war.35  External support can come in the form of money, 
weapons, political support, or technical assistance.  Typically, such external support 
allows an insurgency to graduate from basic guerilla tactics to more sophisticated 
operations, resulting in the creation of a regular army.36  If there are resources available 
in an insurgency-controlled area then combatants rely less on external third-party support 
and more control over resources. The existence of such resources may lead to outside 
support on all sides of the conflict, as both insurgent and counterinsurgent forces seek to 
control the resources.37   
 The existence of resource revenues can change the nature of how the conflict is 
fought and prolong intrastate wars in several ways. The first effect is that it allows a 
weaker party to continue fighting.  Second, the organization and cohesion of an armed 
group can be impacted by access to resources, which may increase the duration of the 
conflict.  Third, the location of the resources and type of resource can impact the intensity 
and where the fighting takes place.  Fourth, with money flowing in, a rebel force has 
more to gain through the conflict than peace. It makes peace talks slower and less likely 
to succeed.  Finally, third party resolve can be weakened by the prospect of gaining 
access to the resources.38 Regardless of whether resources are supplied externally or from 
within a rebellion, once a rebellion has access it is able to finance and prolong the fight.   
A rebellion, at the onset, must be able to generate popular support, the third 
characteristic of an insurgency.  Even if an insurgency has access to internal resources, it 
must gain momentum to become a true movement, otherwise it can stagnate into a gang 
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of criminals.  Whether resources are internally or externally provided, a movement needs 
a base of support.  A successful insurgency generally will have a core grievance and a 
strong ideological cause to attract support from the population.  The goal is to take up a 
cause that will appeal to the largest number of supporters and at the same time deter 
potential opponents.39 The more a majority of the population identifies with an 
insurgency through its cause, the more the movement will gain support and traction.  
Typically insurgents base their political movements on greed, desire for economic gain, 
or grievance, a catch-all to include a wide range of perceived injustices in order to 
mobilize large swaths of the population.40  The nature of the cause is key to an 
insurgent’s recruitment and local buy in.  The cause must be broad enough to encompass 
a large base of the population.  The strong ideological nature of the cause usually 
provides an insurgency with a strong will to fight.41  Thus an insurgency tends to 
structure the conflict as a “contest of wills” against his opponent. 
The size, capability, and need for popular support are all dynamics that define the 
nature of an insurgency.  The population is central to an insurgency because of its 
limiting characteristics.  By providing support, material, moral, ideological, and 
personnel, the population helps an insurgency to overcome its inherent weakness vis a vis 
the government.  Even if an insurgency is able to secure resources outside the population, 
it still is dependent on the population to hide, blend, and live until it is large enough 
challenge on the state’s security forces directly.  Resource driven conflicts are much less 
about the winning  “hearts and minds” of the population; however, an armed group risks 
losing legitimacy if the adversary portrays the group as bandits and criminals verse a true 
movement.  For this reason, even resource independent insurgencies have to gain support 
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from the local population, or they will never be anything other than criminals and never 
gain enough political legitimacy and influence to change the current government.42  
Though an insurgency is able to make use of its limiting factors and use those 
characteristics to its advantage, at some point in the conflict, an insurgency must be able 
to grow to a size and capability of eventually taking on counterinsurgent forces directly 
and defeating them.  An insurgency needs manpower to survive, grow, and ultimately to 
win.43  Being small and fluid may be an advantage for the insurgency during the onset of 
the conflict, but if it is to ever going to challenge the government directly it will need to 
mass in size and capacity.  In addition to growing its force, an insurgency does not have 
state-run infrastructures to provide supplies, money, ammunition and other war materials.  
An insurgency needs support and a way to balance the odds that are stacked against them.  
The appropriate material conditions for organizing an effective insurgency are difficult to 
achieve, in other words revolutionary supplies are short.  The more risk starting an 
insurgent movement the less likely it is to succeed.   
There are ways for an insurgency to gain the resources required to sustain itself 
such as external support from other governments, contributions from diaspora and 
exploiting primary commodities.44  However, a population is another means to that end.  
Joint Publication 3–24 states, “an insurgency typically succeeds or fails based on the 
support of the population.”45  Thus an insurgency must attract support from the 
population in order to win the conflict.   A rebellion may be able to survive on resources 
and money from outside, but if it ever wants to achieve the goal of overthrowing or 
changing the status quo, it must grow into an armed group that can win.  The population 
is key to that growth and momentum. A successful insurgency will start small and 
limited, but grow large.  The pool of bodies and capable fighters must come from the 
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population. Throughout the conflict, an insurgency needs to stay connected to the 
population, or otherwise it will stagnate or wither away.  For this reason insurgent forces 
constantly battle the counterinsurgent forces for influence over the population. 
2.  Counterinsurgency 
It seems intuitive that a counterinsurgency holds the opposite challenges than an 
insurgency.  In the words of Michael Shafer,  “If insurgency was but a tactic a counter 
tactic is needed.”46 A logical argument for developing a strong counterinsurgency 
strategy is to apply the principles and insurgent tactics in reverse. The counterinsurgency 
characteristics are in direct contrast to an insurgency, it is large in size and sustained by 
resources provided by state.  In contrast to an insurgency, it has a robust capability.  And 
because a counterinsurgency force is the state’s army, it does not need popular support at 
the onset of the conflict.  This dynamic can change as an insurgency gains traction and is 
successful. Never the less, a counterinsurgency is supported by the state. 
Counterinsurgencies, due to their size, start conflicts with a distinct military advantage 
over insurgent forces.  However, their larger size and traditional military structures make 
them slow to move and more rigid than the small fluid insurgency.  A counterinsurgency 
must be able to suppress an insurgency by identifying the threat, isolating it from the 
population, and then defeating it.47  The major challenge for a counterinsurgency is 
gaining the intelligence and “on the ground” knowledge to isolate an insurgency, which 
hides within the population.  Intelligence has to come from the population, and no one 
will provide information if an insurgency maintains power and control over that 
population.  Counterinsurgent forces have to be able to convince the population that it 
will be protected and reprisals will not befall them, should they provide details on the 
insurgent forces.  
  Joint Publication 3–24, COIN doctrine, begins its chapter on 
counterinsurgency by stating, “the population is the critical dimension of successful 
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COIN.”48  Just as an insurgent depends on the population and derives support through its 
ability to influence the population, so too is a counterinsurgent dependant on the 
population.  David Galula explains in his first law of counterinsurgency warfare, “The 
support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for an insurgent.”49  
A counterinsurgency has the means to rid an area of insurgents by its sheer mass and 
strength; the problem is keeping that area clear of insurgents once operations cease.   
Counterinsurgency operations cannot prevent new insurgent cells from reemerging and 
rebuilding without the consent of the population.50  The state needs the population to see 
it as the legitimate power and an insurgency as criminals, so that it will not support an 
insurgent networks.  The population becomes the center of gravity for a state, and a state 
sees the population as a critical vulnerability for an insurgency.  If a counterinsurgency 
can remove support from the insurgents, an insurgency will surely wither away.  The two 
sides must battle for support of the population.  
Unlike an insurgency, a counterinsurgency cannot simply afford to “not lose.”   
The state cannot just destroy a particular area or political organization to defeat a rebel 
movement, because an insurgency can always reorganize and rebuild.  One key to victory 
for the state is permanently isolating an insurgency from the population.  This cannot be 
forced upon the population, but the population itself must actually maintain the 
conditions of isolation.51  The population must be ideologically divorced from an 
insurgency in order to ostracize it.  In Things Fall Apart, an insurgency’s end game is 
described as “the size and the operational temp of an insurgency continues to deteriorate 
at a declining rate until the group finally reaches the point it can no longer pose an 
organized military challenge.”52   In instances where insurgencies have begun to use 
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natural resources to finance the movement, the national governments will unleash 
military forces to secure those resources.  Eager to maintain its hold or consolidate 
control, the government will take extreme measures.53   However, in these cases as seen 
above, an insurgency still relies heavily on the population either for manpower, 
legitimacy, or the ability to hide.  The government still aims to erode the popular support 
for a rebellion regardless of external support.   As an insurgency expends resources to 
fight the state and it can no longer recharge using the population, then it will be 
significantly weakened and vulnerable to a counterinsurgency offensive. If a 
counterinsurgency is able to persuade a population that the rebellion is not a legitimate 
alternative to the government, then the counter insurgent has seized the initiative. A 
counterinsurgency seeks to influence the population to this end.  
Counterinsurgency operations cannot take a cookie cutter approach to conflicts, 
because not all insurgencies emerge with the same dynamics.   Insurgencies supported by 
external actors or able to finance themselves change the human dimension to COIN.  
Pierre Englebert states the following on how resources affect such wars, “Commodities 
are configured in widely divergent and geographic ways, and these differences will lead 
to very different war trajectories.”54  Other factors such as globalization exacerbates the 
resource effect on conflict, as improved transportation and communications assist the 
least sophisticated insurgents.55  Despite the level of resource influences on a conflict, the 
local population plays a significant role in both the eyes of an insurgency and its 
counterinsurgency.  The more one side has support from that population, the more likely 
it is to succeed over its enemy.  Counter insurgencies have many dynamics that can affect 
the outcome of a conflict, but the population remains a significant key to victory on either 
side.  Whether motivated by greed or grievance, the human dimension within an 
insurgency driven conflict cannot be ignored.   
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C.  STABILITY OPERATIONS 
Stability Operations are similar to COIN in that these activities can occur 
throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in 
combat and non-combat environments.   The U.S. military combines the concept of 
stability operations with Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations 
(SSTR).  This section will identify stability operations as all those functions that are seen 
in SSTR.  Stability Operations have the following objective: 
[M]ilitary and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace 
to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions...The long-
term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential 
services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, 
and a robust civil society.56   
The focus on the population and human aspects of stability operations are easier to 
identify than that of COIN, because of the nature of stability operations.  The main 
objective of stability operations lies with the local population and focuses on building 
local, regional and national government capacity.   Stability Operations are not confined 
to combat or post combat environments.  These operations can occur across the 
continuum from peace to crisis to conflict in order to assist a state or region that is under 
severe stress or on the verge of collapse due to either man-made or natural disasters.  This 
section will focus on the post conflict aspects of stability operations and the human 
dynamics involved.  
Stability Operations are a strategy that can be used to provide direct assistance in 
stabilizing a situation and building self-sufficient capacity in the crisis area.  According to 
the U.S. SSTR Joint Operations Concept, the major elements to providing stability, also 
referred to as mission essential elements (MEE’s) are as follows: 1. Establish and 
maintain a safe and secure environment; 2. Deliver humanitarian assistance; 3. 
Reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services; 4. Support economic 
development; 5. Establish rule of law and effective governance; 6. Conduct strategic 
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communications.57  The majority of these tasks are centered on a civilian population, not 
fighters.  For this reason, stability operations are not solely a military effort, but rather 
one that requires a carefully coordinated deployment of military and civilian, public and 
private, and international assets.58  Post conflict environments are inherently complex 
and full of chaos and disorder.  Providing for local populations during such an 
environment is extremely challenging and cannot be done by one agency or entity 
alone.59  The military represents only one, but essential portion of the overall effort.    
Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis challenge the sequential military approach to 
stability operations in their article, “Winning the Peace.”  Using the U.S. experience in 
Iraq, the authors assert that stability operations are not a sequenced event within the 
overall spectrum of operations, but can occur simultaneously with other military 
operations.  This concept means that stability operations can be conducted concurrently 
with COIN operations in an overall strategy.  Strictly kinetic operations are not sufficient 
to defeat an insurgency and the sequential mind-set of providing security before stability 
operations is not effective.60  These authors point to the human dimension by 
emphasizing the need for non-kinetic operations throughout the full spectrum of 
operations. Military stability and reconstruction efforts play a vital role within broader 
construct of a counterinsurgency campaign because it provides time and space for civilian 
capacity to backfill existing military programs and functions.  Reconstruction can occur 
concurrently with kinetic operations.61 Mark Ryan, in his article about military 
reconstruction efforts emphasizes the importance of the local population within stability 
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operations. “The human dimension is the most significant aspect of the environment in 
which reconstruction operations will be conducted.”62   
In the post conflict environment, the drivers of instability and conflict tend to 
reinforce one another, creating a degenerating cycle.  These conditions can continue to 
deteriorate, and the core grievances and perception of insecurity of the local population 
intensify. Without a countervailing force to break this cycle, these developments can 
eventually destabilize the entire system.63  Stability Operations can be that countervailing 
force if it successfully addresses the perceived core grievances and insecurity in a region.  
When considering the objectives of stability operations in a post conflict environment, 
the salience of a population is undeniable.  
D.  HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
 The final type of post conflict operations to be explored is humanitarian 
assistance (HA). Like Stability Operations, the link to the human dynamic is much easier 
to see than COIN because of the nature of HA.  HA can occur in both combat and non-
combat environments.   This section will examine the human dimension of HA as a 
military operation verse international humanitarian assistance efforts.  The U.S. military 
deems these operations as Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR).  Foreign 
Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) is another way the U.S. military describes HA 
operations overseas.  For the purposes of this study, HA will cover the broad military 
aspects of HA/DR and FHA.  Though multiple agendas within a HA mission can exist, 
the immediate aim of HA is to prevent and relieve human suffering from either man-
made or natural events.64  U.S. doctrine uses various forms of HA to train its own troops 
or achieve specific political objectives.  However, the core task of HA is to provide 
humanitarian assistance.65  It is hard to deny the importance and relevance of the 
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population when the very name of the operation has “humanitarian” in the title.  The 
main focus of HA is the population and those in need, whether the disaster is famine, 
war, or a tsunami.  
Human crises within the post conflict environment are also referred to as complex 
emergencies. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines such emergencies as 
follows:  
Complex emergencies are situations of disrupted livelihoods and threats to 
life produced by warfare, civil disturbance and large-scale movements of 
people, in which any emergency response has to be conducted in a 
difficult political and security environment. Complex emergencies 
combine internal conflict with large-scale displacements of people, mass 
famine or food shortage, and fragile or failing economic, political, and 
social institutions. Often, complex emergencies are also exacerbated by 
natural disasters.66  
HA in the post war environment provides many challenges to a military responding; 
however, the immediate focus of a military is to relieve the suffering of the people.  
Militaries use civil-military assets to conduct such HA missions, which will be discussed 
in further detail in the next chapter.  
Within the post conflict phase in the spectrum of operations, a military is forced 
to conduct a wide variety of operations to address the complexity of the environment.  A 
military can be engaged in COIN, Stability Operations, HA, or any mixture of those 
operations.  One prevailing theme in the three post conflict military operations examined 
is the salience of the population.  In COIN, both insurgents and counterinsurgents fight 
for influencing the local population for support, enhancing the likelihood of victory.  
Stability Operations are directly linked to improving or establishing basic services and 
capacity to a civilian population. And HA is designed to relieve the immediate sufferings 
of a population affected by a disaster.  The human dimension throughout all of these 
military operations shape the complexity of the environment.  Though no post conflict 
operation looks the same, they are all entrenched with the vast challenges of the human 
dimension.  Human dynamics are demanding obstacles, which a military must negotiate 
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through.  Engaging the population is a complex military operation all in itself.  A military 
involved in a post war environment that is able to engage the population and address its 
perceived grievances will certainly increase its chances of success.    
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III.  CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS 
A.  WHAT IS CMO? 
The purpose of this chapter is to define what civil military operations are and to 
explain the relevance of CMO in the post conflict environment using accepted CMO 
theories and doctrine.  The previous chapter proved that post conflict military operations 
such as COIN, stability operations and HA are population centric. These operations all 
add up to irregular warfare where “the population…becomes the objective.”67  This 
chapter will provide the framework of how a military can engage a civilian population 
through the use of CMO.   Regardless of the nature of the operation, military forces will 
usually encounter various civilians living and operating in and around their area of 
operations (AO).  People, both individually and collectively, can have a positive, a 
negative, or no impact on military operations.68  It is imperative for a military to have the 
ability to determine whether or not the population will help or hinder operations.  As seen 
in the last chapter, a military seeks to influence the population in a post conflict scenario. 
CMO activities are tools for a military commander to make those determinations and 
influences in a complex environment. CMO engagements are a primary military 
mechanism to synchronize military and non-military instruments of national power, 
particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with 
asymmetric and irregular threats.69  CMO strategies are essential to a military operating 
in a post conflict environment.  
The concept of militaries engaging civilian populations is not new to modern day 
militaries.  European nations, such as Great Britain, France and Belgium found as they 
expanded into other parts of the world, traditional military techniques were not always 
adequate when dealing with a new environment.  These European nations began to train 
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their soldiers in local cultures and behaviors in order to better engage in the civilian 
populations.70  The United States has a rich history of civil-military engagements, as 
well.  The current U.S. doctrine stems from its post World War II experience that 
includes but is not limited to operations in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama, 
Iraq and Afghanistan.71  Large multi-national organizations such as the United Nations 
(UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU) also 
developed doctrine and training on executing civil military relations and coordination.  
Each nation and multi-national organization uses different concepts of CMO because the 
UN, NATO, EU, and various nations do not always have the same mission sets.72 
Each organization not only uses slightly varying concepts of CMO, but they also 
use different terminology.  The U.S. military uses the term CMO that is defined by Joint 
Publication 3–57 Civil Military Operations as  
The activities of a commander that establish collaborative relationships 
among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian 
organization and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, 
neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate overall military 
operations.73  
The U.S. military also distinguishes a difference between CMO and Civil Affairs 
Operations (CAO).   CAO is defined by Field Manual 3–05.40 Civil Affairs Operations 
as  
Those military operations planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by 
[Civil Affairs] for, through, with or by [Other Government Agencies, 
indigenous populations and institutions, International Government 
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mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing the 
capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of CMO 
and other U.S. objectives.74 
By these definitions, CAO are a subset of CMO.  Specific forces conduct CAO in 
order to support the commander’s overall CMO strategy within an operational area.  
CMO engagements are primarily military instruments and are inherent to military 
commanders’ responsibilities.75  The U.S. concept of CMO focuses on facilitating overall 
military objectives. Other organizations do not always focus their civ-mil engagements 
on the military aspects of an operation, but rather emphasize the humanitarian goals to 
civ-mil mission. 
NATO uses the term Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) to describe the military 
activities within a civilian population. The Allied Joint Publication-9 (AJP-9) NATO 
Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine defines CIMIC as  
The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the 
NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and 
local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental 
organizations and agencies.76 
The UN uses both a different term and definition to describe their civil-military missions. 
UN Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) is defined as  
Essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in 
humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote 
humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and 
when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from 
coexistence to cooperation.77 
One can see by the various definitions that each organization has a particular view 
of what civil military operations should look like and where the focus lies.  Cedric de 
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Coning asserts that the core difference between UN CMCoord and NATO CIMIC is the 
emphasis on coordination verses cooperation.  NATO’s verbiage suggests that 
coordination is the best a military can hope for when conducting CIMIC, while the UN 
definition looks for a more synchronized effort.  Both organizations see coexistence as 
the minimum standard.78  In the same vein, Volker Franke describes the doctrinal 
differences between CIMIC and the U.S. version of CMO.  CIMIC focuses more on the 
humanitarian principles within an area.  Whereas CMO focus on the military needs and 
how to gain support from a civilian population in order to meet a specific military 
objective.79  
CMO, CIMIC, CAO, and CMCoord all overlap functionally with nuanced 
differences in each concept.  It is important to understand the various distinctions that 
each organization or nation brings with the concept of civil-military engagements.  
Because civil-military operations mean different things to different organizations, the 
precise definition of CMO needs be clear in the context of this study.  This study will use 
the CMO concept as based on U.S. military doctrine where the focus of CMO is as 
military tool used to achieve military needs.  The U.S. definition of CMO pertains to the 
next chapter’s UPDF case study because the UPDF is a partnered force with the United 
States and received CMO specific training from the U.S..80  With the definition of CMO 
clearly outlined, the next section will examine how CMO should be integrated within a 
wide scope of post conflict operations.  
It is important to note that the U.S. doctrine specifically addresses CMO activities 
that occur in foreign nations.  U.S. military units do not conduct CMO projects on U.S. 
territory, except for extremely rare occasions when the U.S. military assists civil 
authorities in disaster relief.   These cases are not outlined in the U.S. military doctrine 
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and are addressed through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).81   When U.S. 
forces apply CMO strategies, the U.S. is a third party force assisting in host nation 
capacity building.82  The principles seen in the CMO framework are designed to enhance 
state capacity.  The next section will outline that framework in detail.   If CMO 
framework is meant to increase a host nation’s ability to govern then it is assumed that if 
that government adheres to those same concepts without a third-party, then CMO 
doctrine should be adequate for domestic use.  The Northern Uganda case study will 
show what implications if any exist when a military conducts CMO missions on its own 
soil.  
B.  CMO FRAMEWORK 
In a post conflict environment, cooperation between civilians and military 
elements involve integrating traditional military capabilities into a collective response.  
This section will discuss the general framework for implementing CMO.  Civilian and 
military actors share the common goals of promoting security and creating conditions to 
transition back to stable structures.83   At times, CMO may require military forces to 
perform tasks usually the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government.  
These activities can occur before, during or after other military operations.84  CMO can 
be incorporated into a variety of post conflict operations, but can also be a stand-alone 
operation.   The complexity of a post conflict environment requires that all levels of 
military and civilian assets work together to accomplish the same objectives.  
1.  CMO Functions  
The goal of CMO is not just minimizing civilian interference in military 
operations, but it is a tool to hasten an end to hostilities and attempt to limit collateral 
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damage on a local population from offensive, defensive or stability operations.85   While 
the use of CMO is meant to help bring an end to conflict, it is also an essential tool 
throughout the entire range for military operations.  The U.S. Joint Operations Doctrine 
uses phases 0 –V to describe the range of military operations.  The phases are as follows: 
Phase 0-Shape, Phase I- Deter, Phase II- Seize Initiative, Phase III- Dominate, Phase IV- 
Stabilize and Phase V- Enable Civil Authority.86  CMO activities play a critical role in 
each of these phases as outlined by the Joint Field Manual 3–57.  During Phase 0, timely 
use of CMO can mitigate the need for other military operations in response to a crisis.  
By shaping the conditions before conflict occurs through civil-military engagements, a 
military can possibly avert the crisis all together.  In Phase I, CMO missions are a source 
of soft power to influence the population and avoid using kinetic military power. By 
deterring the population away from an insurgency or violence, CMO can minimize the 
use of military coercion.   CMO actions in Phase II are used to down grade the enemy 
capability. Population and resource control are implemented during this phase to limit 
resources to the enemy force.   During Phase III the bulk of combat operations occur; 
minimizing civilian interference on the battlefield is a primary function of CMO.  Phase 
IV CMO plans focus on humanitarian relief, civil order and restoration of public goods. 
In this phase, the majority of combat operations ceased and post conflict activities begin.  
Finally, Phase V CMO missions emphasize the rehabilitation or restoration of civil-sector 
functions.87  Each phase of combat operations has a particular role for integrated CMO 
efforts from shaping operations to the restoration of civil authority.  
Just as CMO integration is seen in the full spectrum of operations, its applications 
are in every level of warfare from tactical to strategic.88  Strategic CMO planners look at 
the larger long-term regional issues to include economic development, reconstruction and 
stability.  On the operational scale, CMO actions focus on near term issues such as health 
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services, food and human security.  Finally, at the tactical level CMO missions promote 
legitimacy and gain support from the local population.89  A military can gain popular 
support by conducting ground level CMO projects.  These CMO projects provide an 
opportunity for the military to achieve good public relations (PR) through helping local 
communities. The implications of civil military coordination and operations impact the 
broad scale of military operations at each level of employment.  
John Fishel, in his book Civil Military Operations in the New World, describes 
three distinct pillars commanders use to develop a CMO strategy at any level of warfare.  
He uses the concept of ends, ways and means to break down effective CMO 
implementation.  The ends can vary at each level of warfare, but need to culminate into a 
national objective.  This pillar implies that unity of effort is needed from tactical, 
operational and strategic level planning.   The ways are defined as the concept of 
operations for civil-military engagements.  This pillar concentrates on the interagency 
coordination that must occur during CMO planning and execution.  Again, Fishel 
emphasizes the concept of unifying and synchronizing efforts.  And finally the means are 
defined as the resources used to achieve the tasks outlined by the first two pillars. The 
means come in the form of either massing forces or using the economy of force in order 
to execute the mission.  
 According to military doctrine, CMO strategy must be well coordinated at all 
levels from the tactical to the strategic level just like any other major military operation, 
because it is a military operation.  The overarching theme that runs through each pillar is 
unity of effort.90  CMO doctrine assumes that all of the parties will work together in 
unison to achieve a consolidated objective. CMO emerging as a harmonized endeavor 
does not always occur in practice.  Military objects drive CMO.  This is problematic 
when the military has its own agendas and objective that do not synchronize with the 
goals of civilian organizations. Though CMO projects can be an important piece in the 
overall post conflict reconstruction, it can also cause inconsistency amongst the overall 
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efforts.  Just because an operation is called “CMO” does not mean it is the silver bullet to 
solve all the post conflict reconstruction woes.   If it is not properly employed CMO 
projects can hinder the overall efforts just as much as it can help.  
Many people, to include military commanders, associate CMO as “feel good” 
activities.  CMO objectives accomplish nothing if it is not nested within larger military 
goals.  CMO operators are soldiers, not humanitarians.  The distinction can be difficult to 
make if the goals of the CMO campaign are not outlined from the onset.  Most people 
naturally desire to help fellow human beings in need.  CMO planners can be lured into 
the trap of “just wanting to make a difference” or “just wanting to help.”  But CMO 
activities are not designed to only help all those who are suffering, but are meant to attack 
specific military objectives, such as influencing a population or creating an economic 
environment that promotes trade in a specific village.  
Even when government agencies are able to coordinate with the military, the 
process can be long and tedious.  A primary example of how extensive bureaucratic 
processes can be comes from the Combine Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-
HOA). Enforcing extensive guidelines to ensure maximum cooperation between the 
civilian and military actors occurs actually hampered progress with the CJTF-HOA CMO 
projects out of Djibouti. According to Professor Jessica Piombo,  
Any project … requires approval by three separate authorities—by the 
civil-military operations shop at the headquarters in Djibouti, by the 
Humanitarian Assistance branch of USAFRICOM, and by the U.S. 
embassy in each country. The purpose of this review is to ensure that the 
nominated project meets the goals of the humanitarian assistance program 
and that it is coordinated with the U.S. embassy and its programs and 
goals.91 
This illustrates the difficulties that occur even when government agencies are 
attempting to work together.  CMO operators and the local governments become 
frustrated with the exaggerated timelines for seemingly simple projects.   Even in the 
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most conducive environments, CMO undertakings are inherently complex and must 
contend with multiple organizational personalities.  
CMO is not the sole means or even the most valuable way to fix humanitarian 
problems in complex emergencies, but when used effectively it can achieve deliberate 
military objectives.   Specifically, in situations where security provisions are required, the 
military becomes the logical partner. A military can provide protection for other 
reconstruction efforts. Also, the mission oriented mind-set of a military can be harnessed 
in the overall post conflict efforts.  Militaries are quick to mobilize and make “things 
happen.”  In Afghanistan, U.S. forces used the military to conduct “quick impact” 
projects to bridge the gap while other development agencies focused on long-term 
economic goals.92   Using CMO capabilities in the context of a military mission, but 
concurrently allowing that mission to benefit the overall development piece is the balance 
that military planners should attain.  
 The post conflict environment is ripe with crises and potential crises; actors from 
a multitude of organizations are involved with providing security, alleviating suffering, 
promoting governance and rule of law.  Even when all these characters do agree on the 
same set of goals, coordination and integration proves to be difficult and flawed.  But 
many times the main actors involved in post conflict scenarios do not agree on the most 
basic issues. For example, should the military even be involved?  The following section 
will briefly outline some of the discourse surrounding CMO and the proposed solutions 
to those issues.  
2.  CMO Dilemmas  
The use of CMO has its critics.  Though the mission of CMO is defined as a 
commander’s instrument to obtain military objectives, not all military actors support the 
concept of military led engagements.   Some military leaders prefer not to conduct CMO 
and only take on the task when it is a military necessity or required by political entities. 
In the U.S. experience, military reluctance to become involved in low intensity conflicts 
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can be traced back to Vietnam. Many senior officers felt that CMO and other non-kinetic 
activities distract from the military’s core mission, which is to win wars and fight the 
nation’s battles.93  This hesitation followed the U.S. military all the way to post war 
reconstruction in Iraq in 2003. Military leaders were pushed into conducting 
reconstruction because of a lack of civilian alternatives.94   Though the U.S. has civilian 
components dedicated to promoting development and post conflict reconstruction, such 
as USAID and the Department of State, many countries do not have the capacity to create 
such stand alone agencies.  It is many times the case; a nation’s military is the only 
government institution strong enough and with the ability or funding to operate in post 
conflict environments.   
Even in nations who have robust civilian organizations the military at times 
becomes the default tool to conduct post conflict reconstruction missions.  In the U.S. 
example, the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan the mindset of the top leadership felt 
that “if you break it; you buy it.”  This indicated that if the military conducted combat 
operations then it would be required to fix what it “broke.”  New doctrine emerged from 
the Department of Defense to expound upon the complexity of post war issues that 
challenged the military.  One such doctrine is the Military Support for Stability, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction.  Through experience and lessons learned, the U.S. 
military perception of post conflict issues evolved to become more inclusive.95 This 
example of evolving doctrine and mindset concerning the role of CMO in a post conflict 
can be used by other militaries on how to address the reluctance to embrace the concept.  
While military leaders can be hesitant to take on CMO missions, civilian 
components involved in post conflict reconstruction are at times unwilling to work with 
military components, as well.  Some humanitarians fear that working with the military 
will make efforts become military centric.  There have been several debates surrounding 
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the use of CMO in the post conflict environment by non-military organizations.  For 
instance, NGOs see a potential for CMO to undermine the impartial nature of 
humanitarian aid.  NGOs fear that militaries use humanitarian assistance to gain trust, 
access, placement and intelligence.  Conflicting with impartiality can cause confusion 
amongst the population and undermine the NGOs’ own mission.  These concerns led to 
the concept of “humanitarian space,” where military involvement only comes in the worst 
emergencies.96   Even the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) makes a point to maintain a clear separation between the military and 
humanitarian roles in complex emergencies.  The concept of humanitarian space allows 
for military and humanitarian actors to operate within their own spheres of 
responsibility.97  
While NGOs are sometimes unwilling to share humanitarian space with a 
military, they can provide a unique and important perspective to CMO operators.  NGOs 
have a unique standpoint when engaging a local population because of the time they 
spend in an area typically supersedes the time of any military force operating in that 
region.  NGOs often do more than provide basic needs to suffering populations, but also 
are able to bring together conflicting parties. Enhancing the ability of local NGOs and 
ensuring their security in hostile or non-friendly areas are a precondition to successful 
CMO.98  Using NGOs or information from NGOs can allow a military to maintain a 
good relationship with the local population and gain an intimate understanding of the 
culture.  By setting the right tone through NGOs, a military’s chance of successful civil-
military engagements increases.    
Volker Franke makes several recommendations on how civilians and military 
actors in the post conflict environment can work together effectively.  Military and 
civilian planners should create a division of labor that exploits organizations’ 
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“comparative advantage.”  For a military the tasks can include providing security, logistic 
capabilities, organization, discipline and a sense of mission accomplishment.  For the 
civilian sector, the tasks could include technical expertise, networking NGOS and IGOs, 
detailed knowledge of the AO and long-term relationships with the local population.  By 
using a comparative advantage model for CMO, military and civilian actors complement 
each other verses competing with each other.99  In order to succeed, both the 
humanitarian and military aspects to post conflict operations must be taught to civilians 
and military personnel.  Training post conflict organizations about each other’s 
capabilities will identify strengths and weakness in civilian and military elements. 
Knowing where the gaps exist makes it possible to address them.  
The final CMO challenge is posed by apparent organizational culture differences 
between humanitarian and the military actors.  Most humanitarian organizations are a 
horizontal structure, making simultaneous lateral decisions. On the other hand a military 
is much more hierarchical, central in planning and a top down organization.  Most 
militaries train their personnel to coordinate, while humanitarian employees emphasize 
self-reliance in their areas of expertise.100  This disparity in organizational culture can 
cause confusion where in the planning process the decisions are made.101   These issues 
can be addressed through interagency training, as mentioned earlier.  Eric James puts the 
onus of training on military components verses the humanitarian actors because militaries 
are typically better funded and more heavily manned than nongovernmental 
organizations. NGOs are small and do not usually have enough resources (both human 
and financial) to attend multiple training sessions and conferences.102   Despite who 
shoulders the training responsibility, both civilian and military planners need to become 
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familiar with each other’s operations.  Training, education and communication are 
essential to addressing the culture clash between humanitarian and military actors in the 
post conflict environment.  
Another inherent cultural difference is that the core missions of military and 
humanitarian organizations are respectively at odds with each other. The military is there 
to win wars. The humanitarian is there to alleviate suffering.  These missions do overlap 
in a post conflict environment and both elements become population centric.   The 
military seeks to provide security and a safe environment for post conflict operations.  
Through security, humanitarian actors are given space to administer aid and other 
assistance. Without security, civilian actors may be unable to complete the relief mission.  
A military’s ability to provide security is a lynch pin in complex post conflict 
environments.103  During the post conflict phases IV and V of military operations, both 
humanitarian and military missions work to the same end instead of contradict each other.  
The debates surrounding military involvement in post conflict issues are valid, but 
through proper communication between military and non-military actors these concerns 
can be mitigated to some degree of cooperation.  This is not to say that the discourse 
surrounding using a military to nation build will cease, but communication can close the 
gap.  The organizational differences and bureaucratic infighting will always exist 
between the military and its civilian counterparts.   However, if CMO planners are able to 
identify these issues, then some of the competiveness and challenges of Civilian-Military 
coordination can be avoided.  By identifying humanitarian space, training military actors, 
effectively using NGO knowledge, CMO engagement benefit all parties involved in post 
conflict operations, not just the military.   
The military brings a remarkable amount of capability to a crisis.  They can have 
an effective means to deliver assistance, deploy a large number of personnel and 
equipment in a short time frame.  A military can provide resources, protection, logistic 
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supplies, information, communication and various services to crisis situations.104  At the 
same time, humanitarian actors bring a certain level of expertise when it comes to 
identifying vulnerabilities in a population.105 Finding the comparative advantage for 
military and humanitarian actors is essential to facilitating successful CMO activities.  
Training and communication allows for a common understanding for those involved in 
post conflict operations.  Understanding the definition of CMO and how it works within 
the phases of operations is essential to that interagency dialogue. The following sections 
will provide more depth examination of the role of CMO within COIN and stability 
operations.  
C.  CMO IN COIN 
Academics and military strategists write about the salience of CMO and non-
kinetic operations when conducting counterinsurgency operations.   During an 
insurgency-based conflict, both an insurgency and its counterinsurgency seek support 
from the population.  CMO is how a military is able to engage and eventually influence 
that population.  For a counterinsurgent force, it is no longer sufficient to think in purely 
kinetic terms. Executing traditionally focused combat operations and concentrating on 
training local security forces works, but this is only a short-term solution. In the long 
term, only focusing on combat and developing combat forces can hinder true progress 
while promoting the growth of insurgent forces working against campaign objectives.  
Attacking an insurgency by only kinetic means is a lopsided approach.106  In this 
construct, COIN operations require a non-kinetic element.  
Field manual 3-57 states, “CMO support to COIN is depriving the insurgents of 
their ‘greatest weapon’ a dissatisfied population.”107  Of the core CMO tasks, population 
and resource control becomes the most salient during COIN.  Using CMO, a military can 
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starve an insurgency, limiting both resources and exposure to the population.  Population 
control provides security for the population and at the same time denies availability of 
personnel to enemy forces. Resource control regulates movement or consumption of 
materials and denies an insurgency access to those materials.  Integrating CMO activities 
can effectively isolate the insurgents from the population, which is a key tactic in COIN 
operations.  
COIN theorist David Killcullen provides a “how to” guide for CMO in 
counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level.  He asserts that the unit should start 
with addressing the basic needs within a local population and slowly move up Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs. He states, “Counterinsurgency is armed social work: an attempt to 
redress back social and political problems while being shot at.”108   Killcullen makes 
pertinent assertions about conducting CMO at a tactical level using the U.S. experiences 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In a COIN environment, there is no such thing as impartiality. 
Every time a military helps someone, it is hurting someone else at the same time.   In this 
respect, the goal should be to help the population and hurt the insurgency by limiting its 
resources.109   
CMO missions include military led reconstruction operations.  These projects 
require precise, discriminate application of non-kinetic efforts to support the campaign 
plan in an effort to defeat current and future insurgencies.110  Such operations require 
synchronization between military assets and other civilian components. Military 
reconstruction operations play a vital role within broader concept of a counterinsurgency 
campaign.111  CMO efforts provide time and space for civilian capacity to backfill 
existing military programs and functions.  Reconstruction can occur concurrently with 
kinetic operations.  Killcullen makes recommendations on what projects a COIN force 
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should look to provide. Outside of providing basic needs, projects should be small and 
manageable relative to the unit.  Large, long-term projects are hard to manage while 
conducting concurrent COIN operations.112 
While on the tactical level, CMO should look to address the immediate needs of a 
local population, there are large-scale impacts of a military assuming roles typically 
performed by civilians.   David Galula warns that as a military assumes major 
government roles, there is a temptation for it to take over all government activities 
including politics.   Those implementing COIN strategy should seek civilian alternatives 
whenever possible.  Insurgencies stem from political problems and the solution should be 
primarily political, not military in nature.113   
Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies battle for influence over the population.  A 
military seeks to remove the insurgency from the population and any popular support for 
the insurgency.  The counterinsurgent force needs a tool to engage with the population.  
CMO engagements are the instrument to help a military achieve its COIN objectives.  A 
CMO strategy is pertinent to COIN operations because in this environment the population 
is the center of gravity.  
D.  CMO IN STABILITY OPERATIONS 
Just as in COIN, CMO strategy is essential to stability operations.  Stability 
operations aim to establish conditions that support the “transition to 
legitimate…governance, a functional civil society, and viable market economy.”114 Like 
COIN and CMO, stability operations are not easily defined and typically require forces to 
simultaneously conduct kinetic and non-kinetic operations.  It is no longer acceptable to 
think sequentially through stability operations and support operations simply by first 
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establishing a secure environment.115  COIN, stability operations and CMO can all occur 
simultaneously.  Many of the principles found in the application of CMO during COIN 
apply in stability operations as well.  
CMO has three major functions in stability operations. Those functions are as 
follows: coordinate between military and civilian actors in the area of operation, assist the 
civilians within that environment, and support the commander/force.116   First, CMO is 
used to coordinate both military and civilian organizations.  Synchronizing all combat 
and non-combat powers to achieve a singular objective is essential to the definition of 
CMO.  The same principle applies when CMO is used during stabilization activities as all 
entities strive for transition to a competent government and able economy.  The second 
function of CMO within stability operations is to assist in preparing the environment for 
stabilization to occur, which means securing the environment to facilitate transition.  
Securing the environment has two steps, establishing a safe environment and managing 
the immediate consequences of the conflict.  Establishing that secure environment 
includes minimizing the opportunities for criminals and others who benefit from the 
chaos.  These conflict opportunists are referred to as spoilers.117  Finally, the CMO 
campaign must support the objectives stated by the commander conducting stability 
operations.  The emphasis on this function is that CMO engagements must all add up in 
support of the stabilization forces.  
E.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a clear and concise definition of CMO. The focus of CMO 
in a post conflict environment is achieving military objectives in support of overall 
operations.  The framework outlined by CMO doctrine emphasizes that a unity of effort 
must exist between military and non-military elements.  In order to obtain coordination, 
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cooperation or synchronization from all elements of national power, CMO planning is 
required in complex environments.   CMO missions occur at every level of operations 
and at every phase in the spectrum of warfare.  CMO strategies should be planned and 
executed like any other military operation, integrating the objectives in to an entire 
campaign plan.   
Civilians and military actors will always work in the same space in a post 
conflicts situation.  Though civilian and humanitarian components have various goals and 
missions, these objectives can be aligned with a military mission.   Through training and 
open communication by stakeholders, the civilian and military actors can reach a point of 
comparative advantage in the complex environment.  Teaching and education is essential 
to bridging the disparities amongst humanitarian works and military components.  
CMO engagements are critically important to COIN operations. By maximizing 
the concept of population and resource control, CMO operators can isolate an insurgency.  
Through active reconstruction and projects, a military can bring legitimacy to the state 
and dissuade a population from an insurgency.  COIN actions are about winning the 
population over.  A CMO strategy can focus in those activities and provide a way for 
meaningful engagements by a counterinsurgent force.  Within stability operations, CMO 
principles remain the same as in COIN.  By using the fundamentals of CMO, civilian and 
military stabilization efforts are harmonized.  The military is able to fill gaps in security, 
logistics and services that a civilian force needs.  At the same time, the civilian sector 
brings expertise, detailed understanding of culture and humanitarian principles to the 
transition efforts.  CMO strategy is relevant to post conflict activities because of many 
challenges posed by the human element in that environment.   The following chapters 
will provide an in depth case study that will test the theoretical framework concerning 
CMO in the post conflict environment.  Using post conflict Northern Uganda and the 
civil-military engagements conducted by the UPDF, this study will determine if the 




IV.  NORTHERN UGANDA 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONFLICT 
The past three chapters have examined the post conflict environment, identified 
the military operations that occur in that environment and the relevance of CMO within 
the post conflict construct.   The next two chapters will be an in depth case study 
examining the real world application of accepted post conflict civil military operations 
theory.  The focus of this chapter is to study the conflict in Northern Uganda from 1986 
to 2006. By examining the root causes and evolution of the conflict, one can better 
understand the complexities and dynamics that exist in a post conflict Northern Uganda.  
The active conflict between the LRA and the government of Uganda lasted twenty years. 
Once the LRA fled to southern Sudan in 2006 and dispersed in the surrounding countries, 
major combat operations in Uganda ceased.  This chapter will examine the events that 
took place in Uganda up to 2006.  
The disparity between Northern Uganda and the rest of the country can be traced 
back much further than the LRA.  This chapter will explore the historical origins of the 
north-south division starting with the colonial period.  Next, postcolonial dynamics will 
be examined, by studying the regimes and the rebellions that occurred after 
independence.  The last era to be explored is the Museveni regime and the effects that his 
rise to power had on the population in the north.  Once the historical background has 
been established, the emergence of the LRA and their tactics will be examined in detail. 
This section will argue that the LRA’s insurgency rose from the political and economic 
grievances in the north.  At the onset the LRA represented a large portion of the northern 
population, but as external support fueled the rebellion, the LRA’s tactics veered away 
from focusing on population-centric strategies.  Losing the population’s support drove the 
LRA to use intensely coercive tactics.  Once the LRA had alienated a majority of the 
populous, mostly by its own hand, the LRA stagnated as a movement and eventually fled 
Uganda.  It was never able amass enough military force directly confront the UPDF or 
topple the government.   Failing to gain popular support, in the end, the LRA was never 
able to achieve its ultimate political agenda of removing the Museveni government.    
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The final section will outline how the UPDF responded to the LRA tactics in the 
north.  The Ugandan military adopted multiple counterinsurgency strategies during the 
conflict, such as attempts to isolate the insurgency from the population, heavy-handed 
tactics to intimidate the population, and aggressive offensive actions.  This section will 
look at the evolution of the UPDF from its start as the National Resistance Army (NRA) 
and how it engaged in counterinsurgency operations in the north.   This section will 
determine that interactions between the LRA and UPDF were based in violence, fear, and 
combat-centric engagements.  From 1996–2006, neither party attempted to win over the 
population, instead both sides chose strategies of coercion and fear to influence the 
northern population.   This chapter will illustrate that in the struggle between the LRA 
and the UPDF, the welfare of the population was never a major concern for either party.  
That ambivalence had an effect on post conflict Uganda.   By examining the origins and 
progression of the conflict and its impact on the population, one can determine the 
complex challenges the UPDF faced in their post conflict operations.  
B.  NORTHERN UGANDA’S BACKGROUND 
The story of Northern Uganda’s violent conflict began with British colonization.  
Much of the political structures in which ethnic groups interact today are a direct result of 
the systems that Great Britain created.118  Uganda was given to Great Britain as a colony 
under the Berlin Congress of 1884.  Under British rule, the Buganda Agreement of 1900 
placed the Bantu tribespeople of the south as the superior ethnic group over the northern 
tribes, and laid the foundations for an enduring north-south economic and political divide 
that took on ethnic dimensions.119   These British induced divisions eventually led to the 
south and east dominating the economic and political sectors of government, while the 
north was able to gain control of the military.   These regional divisions morphed into 
ethnic cleavages that would splinter the country at independence. 
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British policies intentionally enhanced the southern Baganda’s of the Bantu tribes, 
economic position in the country by establishing a cash crop economy in the south.  The 
British introduced crops to the south such as cotton, cocoa, rubber and coffee to spur the 
economic growth.  The south and east became productive zones due to their agricultural 
economies, while the north was left to find other means for economic growth.120  The 
north was viewed as a pool of farm workers and other human capital.   Because the south 
was more prosperous, the north began to depend on the state to provide jobs.  Both the 
Acholi and Langi are sub-tribes to the largest ethnic group in the north, the Lou.   The 
Lou were traditionally referred to as warriors in their pre-colonial history.  The British 
combined the notion that the northerners were a “warrior-class” with the concept of the 
region was the country’s labor pool and filled the ranks of its security forces with Acholi 
and Langi.121   By the time of independence, the Acholi found themselves dominating the 
military ranks with a political identity rooted deeply in their ethnicity.122    
Thus, by the end of the colonial era, the seeds for subsequent conflict had been 
sown. The south had grown economically prosperous excelling in politics and developing 
their economy, while the north had become overly represented in the military. The Bantu 
tribes were more centrally organized, which made the natural choice for civil servants.  
The Bantu saw themselves as superior to their northern counter parts, regarding those in 
the north as “banamawanga,” meaning foreigners.123  Ethnic identities had begun to 
crystallize around these distinctions as well as the ambition for more political control 
from the north.  Thus, when independence was granted in 1962, the nation was ripe for a 
confrontation between the military power on the one hand, and the economically and 
politically elite, on the other.  
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The Acholi people identified themselves as a separate ethnic group as a 
consequence of the British rule.  The ethnonym, Acholi did not even exist until the 
twentieth century.  Up until 1930s, the Acholi were referred to as Gangi or Shul, who 
traditionally raised cattle and farmed. Acholi stems from the word “An-loco-li” meaning 
simply “I am a human being.”124  Creating ethnic divisions were a part of the colonizers’ 
grand economic strategy. The British successfully maintained control of its colony 
through a classic divide and rule strategy – they developed internal boundaries that 
separated groups, created new communities, and limited interethnic movements.  Both 
the north and south bought into their new ethnic identities and maintained them into the 
postcolonial period.   
The first prime minster of Uganda was Milton Obote, who only deepened the 
north-south divisions by surrounding his administration with a patron network that 
supported Northern Uganda.   Obote was removed by a military coup led by Idi Amin, 
another northerner, in 1971. Under Obote, the predominantly-Acholi Uganda National 
Liberation Army (UNLA) took over the government.125   By the late 1970s and early 
1980s southerners began to mobilize under the premise that they needed to end the series 
of northern dictatorships.  Yoweri Museveni led a rebel army, the National Resistance 
Army (NRA) against the ruling UNLA.  
The NRA was the crucible in which the north-south divide became ethnically 
engineered and this political battle took place at a national level.126  Uganda plunged into 
a civil war with the UNLA representing the north and the NRA fighting for the south.  
Museveni and his top commanders were Bayankole, a Bantu sub-tribe from southwestern 
Uganda.  But large contingents of the NRA were Banyarwanda, Rwandan refugees, 
which comprised up to 3,000 of the 14,000 NRA troops.  The NRA decided to base their 
operations in an area called the Luwero Triangle.  Luwero is located in southern Uganda 
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and had a heterogeneous population of Baganda, another Bantu subtribe, peasants and 
Banyarwanda migrant workers.  The NRA insurgency had the inherent challenge of 
mobilizing the Luwero population to support the rebel army.   Museveni appealed to the 
populous by presenting the rebellion in regional terms as a struggle for the south to 
overthrow the north; this concept carried with it ethnic connotations of the Bantu and 
Nilotic, another major southern tribe.127   Uganda was in a full-fledged civil war.  
By 1984, the UNLA had made little progress fighting the NRA in the Luwero 
Triangle.  Knowing that the densely populated Luwero was not only the base of 
operations for the NRA, but also where the NRA had achieved most of its popular 
support, the UNLA launched a massive attack in Luwero, called Operation Bonanza.   As 
a part of this military operation, the UNLA massacred civilians and soldiers 
indiscriminately.  Operation Bonanza led to more than 300,000 deaths.  The Acholi 
dominated army was widely held responsible for the mass killings.128  The legacy of 
Luwero would haunt the Acholi population for many years after the massacre and 
become a decisive factor for the emergence of insurgent groups seeking redemption.   
With Luwero as a glaring example of northern cruelty, Museveni and his NRM 
were able to mobilize more of the south under a banner of regionalism. The NRM was 
able to gain enough popular support to build an army large enough to defeat the UNLA.  
In 1986, the NRM successfully won the war and took over control of the central 
government.  The Acholi population in particular took the brunt of the anti-north 
sentiment because it was so over represented in the army. After his victory over the 
UNLA, Museveni was sworn in to the office of the President.  The Acholi instantly felt 
the backlash of losing the war.129  The new President immediately removed the Acholi 
elites from power and dissolved any link between the north and the central government.  
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The new government also launched a massive preemptive effort with harsh 
counterinsurgency-like tactics in Northern Uganda in order to squash any attempted 
Acholi counter rebellion.  The efforts were unsuccessful; rebel movements began to rise 
from the disenfranchised population in the north.  These insurgencies attempted to bring 
order to the Acholi society by building a constituency against the new ruling party, the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM).130  The NRA continued to launch aggressive 
campaigns in the north to quell the uprisings.  During this time frame, the NRA viewed 
the entire northern population as the enemy and did not distinguish between civilian and 
rebel.  The more brutal the NRA tactics became, the more the resistance grew.  Each time 
a rebel movement was defeated, a new group formed and absorbed the remnants of the 
defeated.131 
At the same time as the Acholi were being repressed and excluded from the 
government; they also felt that the new regime did not protect them against economic 
predation from other northern groups. While Museveni’s forces were focused on 
disarming the Acholi and Langi in the north, cattle raiders from another northern region, 
called Karamonjong, had gone largely ignored. The Karamojong and Acholi have a 
traditionally hostile relationship with each other.  In 1987, the Karamojong were able to 
secure weapons from the capital, Kampala, for “self defense” purposes.  Some speculate 
this was an intentional move on the NRM’s part to weaken its opposition in the north.  
Massive raids on the cattle in the Gulu and Kitgum districts, home to the Acholi, were the 
result of newly armed Karamojong raiders.   The districts lost approximately $25 million 
from the raids, which was devastating in an economy already ruined by the war.  The 
Acholi felt the government turned a blind eye to the raids, which was destroying the 
economy in the districts of Gulu and Kitgum.132    
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Thus, within a few years of the Museveni regime coming into power, grievances 
towards the central government were high in the face of a defeated UNLA and an 
economy that was being torn apart.  From these sentiments, the first true insurgency rose 
from the north, the Ugandan People’s Defense Army (UPDA). The UPDA developed 
with the sole goal of returning power back to the north and defeating the NRA.  Though 
the UPDA and the NRA fought in several skirmishes, by June of 1988 the UPDA 
surrendered and signed a peace deal with the Museveni government.133   Yet the 
struggles of the northerners were far from over. As the UPDA was fading, a new 
movement was rising- the Holy Spirit Movement, led by Alice Lakwena Walker.  
Lakwena brought something new to the Acholi population — she offered them a 
chance for spiritual redemption.  Lakwena convinced her followers that she could purify 
the deeds that the Acholi committed in the past such as the Luwero massacres when they 
were a part of the UNLA.  Part of this purification included a violent rebellion against the 
NRA.134  By purging not only Acholiland, but also all of Uganda, the Achli could make 
amends for what had occurred during the civil war. The Holy Spirit Movement combined 
spirituality with the already existing grievances towards the government. Her claim to 
spiritual authority resonated with the Acholi population and she was able to assemble an 
army of 7,000–10,000 followers.135  Alice Lakwena was an unsuccessful military 
commander with no tactical or operational proficiency.  She relied too heavily on the 
spiritual aspects of her cause verses using proven military techniques.  One example was 
that she convinced her followers rubbing holy oil on the body would protect them from 
bullets when engaging in combat operations. The Holy Spirit Movement’s inability to 
produce a military victory eventually led to its defeat by 1989.  From the rubble of the 
failed insurgency, another movement emerged, the Lord’s Resistance Army.    
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When Lakwena was defeated, some of her members shifted to the LRA, led by 
Joseph Kony.  Kony, too, claimed to have supernatural abilities.   Joseph Kony was able 
to maximize his movement by claiming he was the successor to Alice Lakwena and able 
to communicate with many spirits including the Holy Spirit.   He also used Acholi 
traditions to gain legitimacy by claiming that his elders blessed him to fight Museveni.136   
Kony’s charismatic leadership attracted a population who as a whole and as individuals 
felt despair.  Like his predecessor, Kony focused on the spiritual aspects of his 
movement.  He combined old Acholi traditions with new rituals, and fed on feelings of 
grievance and desperation to shore up his following.  Through Kony’s leadership, the 
LRA was able wage a war with the government in Northern Uganda for over twenty 
years.  The next section will discuss the nature of the LRA and its tactics.  
C.  THE LRA 
The LRA has morphed over the years from a strong insurgency to a decentralized 
organization spread throughout the Great Lakes Region in Central Africa.  The LRA’s 
political agenda to overthrow the Museveni government and use of violence make it by 
definition an insurgency.  Though many mainstream media portray Joseph Kony as an 
insane cult leader, his group was in fact rational and acted in its own self-interest.  This 
section will show how the LRA has evolved over the past twenty-five years and how the 
group used fear and violence to achieve its immediate goals.  The vicious tactics of the 
LRA has captured the attention of the international community because of the seemingly 
indiscriminate use of violence.  However, these methods of coercion were a calculated 
means for the LRA to survive and cause chaos in Northern Uganda.  
The spiritual order of the LRA gave the organization a perceived legitimacy 
among its members on a level higher than the political plane.  The LRA’s beliefs and 
practices served rational and functional purposes in the operations of the group.  Through 
these spiritual beliefs the LRA was able to exert control.137  Kony took advantage of the 
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deep spiritualism of the Acholi, embedding spirituality in the movement to serve as a 
functional purpose.   Kony purposed himself as the “bearer of an apocalyptic vision.”138 
This vision was the widely excepted view that the Acholi people were on the brink of 
genocide.  The only way to avoid this future was a total moral rejuvenation.  Kony was 
able to combine fear and a need for salvation to gain spiritual authority.  The spiritual 
order of the LRA served as a way to guarantee internal cohesion.  Joseph Kony tied the 
notion of absolute obedience to the spiritual rules as the only way to survive life in the 
bush.   Joseph Kony was calculating; he used rituals integrated with a political agenda to 
assume ultimate control over the LRA soldiers and the surrounding population.139   
Initially, the LRA had the support of the Acholi population and other tribes in the 
north, but that support soon eroded as a result of the counterinsurgency operations in the 
north combined with the LRA’s increased violence towards civilians.  The LRA did not 
have the same initial support from the population as its predecessors, the UNLA and the 
Holy Spirit Movement. A key concept to the LRA’s belief system was that not only 
would the Acholi have to fight the south, but also they would be required to purify the 
population by ridding it of corrupt Acholi. Only the LRA alone could decide who was a 
true Acholi and who was not.  Violence towards civilians was ingrained into the 
movement from its inception; it was the LRA’s duty to use violence in order to carry out 
its political objectives.  In 1991, the government of Uganda launched a massive 
counterinsurgency operation called Operation North with the intent of crushing the 
LRA.140   Popular support dwindled as the LRA became more cruel and aggressive 
towards the population even those who supported them.   The LRA used fear and 
brutality in an effort to prevent the locals from providing information to Museveni’s 
Uganda Peoples Defenses Force (UPDF).141  An illustration of these tactics is that 
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suspected collaborators would have their noses, lips and ears severed.  Also, local 
civilians were not allowed to use bicycles, because the LRA feared they could ride to the 
next village and warn the UPDF of their location. Breaking this rule resulted in a loss of 
limb for the violators.142  By the early 1990s, support for the LRA was waning and the 
insurgency needed to look for other means of recruitment and resources.   
The LRA is most notorious for its abduction of children and use of them as child 
soldiers.  Amnesty International estimates that nearly 80 percent of the LRA fighters 
were abducted children.143  The forced recruitment of adolescents verses young adults 
was a logical decision by the LRA.  Demographics supported this because a large surplus 
of young adolescents.  As support from the local populations in Northern Uganda 
dwindled, the pool of able-bodied young fighters also began to diminish.  Kony’s army 
needed a means to continue fighting and engaging the UPDF.  It was easier to abduct and 
manipulate groups of 15 year olds rather than 20 year olds adults.144   The reason the 
LRA focused on abducting child soldiers is that these young people were thought to be 
the “nucleus of a new Acholi identity.”  These children are a clean slate to be filled with 
the ideals of the LRA.145  
The children were not just used as fighters. Estimates say that approximately 
twenty-five percent of those abducted were female.  These girls became porters, cooks, 
and sex slaves for the army.  Many soldiers took the girls as child-brides.146   Once 
abducted, both the male and female children were forced to commit atrocities and violent 
ritualistic acts.   One ten year old escapee describes such an incident, “On the third day a 
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little girl tried to escape, and they made us kill her…[T]hey kicked her and jumped on 
her, and they made each of us beat her at least once with big pieces of wood.”147  The 
LRA strategically uses violence amongst its abductees to prevent them from escaping.  
The children were afraid to leave for fear of death and afraid to return home after 
participating in brutal acts, such as killing another child or even a member of their own 
family.  
The LRA’s use of children, as horrific as it seems to the outside world, is a cold 
and calculating part of their military strategy.  Abducting adolescents is optimal because 
the children are physically able to perform military tasks.  Child soldiers also have 
longevity because the children are more likely stay and live longer than an adult.148  
Also, though public support for LRA waned, they were still getting support in subtle and 
obscure ways.  One UPDF officer explains, “They still love their sons, even if they are 
rebels. They want to keep their children alive.”149  The forces recruitment of children led 
to force support by family members.  The LRA knew it needed support from the 
population and decided to take by force what it needed to survive versus using the 
“winning the hearts and minds” method.  
The 1991 Operation North almost completely wiped out the LRA, but Kony and 
his army managed to holdout through external support.  By 1994, the LRA was fully 
supported by the Sudanese Government in Khartoum.  The Sudanese government saw the 
LRA as a means to engage its own insurgency the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA) in Southern Sudan.   Khartoum supplied the LRA with weapons to include land 
mines; in return, the LRA would step up attacks against the SPLA.150   The LRA moved 
into southern Sudan and began mounting attacks against the SPLA.   
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With a new life breathed back into the LRA, Kony was able to change up his 
tactics in Northern Uganda.  From 1994 to 2005, the LRA’s political agenda and popular 
support deteriorated even more as it received aid from Sudan.  During this time frame, 
the majority of the population in the north did not support the LRA willingly.  Losing the 
support of the Acholi majority and the success of Operation North left Kony feeling 
betrayed by his own people.  It seemed the entire population had been declared guilty by 
the LRA as they stepped up attacks on the civilians in Northern Uganda.151  The LRA 
unleashed overwhelming violent tactics against the population because support from the 
locals was not as necessary with Sudan’s help.152   The amount of violent attacks against 
the Acholi people increased dramatically.  The LRA was responsible for major 
massacres, such as Atiak with an estimated 220 dead, Karuma with an estimated 50 dead, 
and Lokung-Palabek with an estimated 400 dead.153  Forced recruitments and Sudanese 
support allowed the LRA to exist without popular support.  But this arrangement between 
the LRA and Sudan did not last.  
The LRA and the SPLA were tools for the proxy war between Uganda and Sudan; 
once the two countries were able to come to an agreement, the LRA’s external support 
was shut off.   In 2005, the Government of Sudan and the SPLA signed a Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA).   Without the SPLA to fight, Sudan had no reason to continue 
funneling money to the LRA. Once again, Kony had to adapt to a new situation and the 
LRA began to petition for peace talks.  In July of 2006, the LRA and the government of 
Uganda began to engage in peace negotiations in Juba. These negotiations dragged on for 
two years as the LRA continually stalled the process.  Kony strategically manipulated the 
peace process and the media to achieve strategic means.154  While the government of 
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Uganda was focusing on peace talks, Joseph Kony and his army moved out of Northern 
Uganda and into Southern Sudan.  Since 2006, the LRA has not been able to return to 
Uganda, but still wreaks havoc in neighboring countries.  
Mainstream media and politicians have described the LRA over the past twenty-
five years as lunatics and criminals.  But as seen above, the LRA’s brutal tactics were 
rational decisions, which shaped the environment of its soldiers and the civilians they 
terrorized.  The LRA emerged as a result of a disenfranchised and marginalized 
population.  It has made use of violence in an attempt to achieve the lofty political goal of 
overthrowing the Museveni government. Once popular support decreased significantly, 
the LRA turned to forced recruitment and external support for fighters and weapons.  
Though the LRA has left Uganda, the issues that began the conflict such as the 
marginalized north and the troubled economic conditions still remain in the post conflict 
environment.  The next section will discuss how the UPDF’s strategy evolved over the 
course of the conflict as it attempted to defeat the LRA.   
D.  THE UPDF: COIN IN NORTHERN UGANDA 
The UPDF, which changed its name from NRA in 1995, has been engaged in 
counterinsurgency operations since the NRM took power in 1986. The UPDF’s origins 
are as an insurgency when it overthrew the UNLA and transitioned from an insurgency to 
a counterinsurgent force in a matter of months.   One would assume that coming from an 
insurgency, the UPDF would have an intimate understanding of COIN operations.  
However, this was not the case and the LRA was able to survive and conduct attacks in 
Northern Uganda for twenty years before leaving.  The UPDF’s COIN tactics in the 
North were heavy-handed and many times just as brutal as the LRA.  Over the course of 
the conflict the UPDF began to professionalize its force, which also changed the way it 
conducted operations.  This section will cover the counterinsurgency methods the UPDF 
utilized and the way it engaged the population.  
 When the NRM seized power and the signs uprising appeared in the north, 
Museveni’s army conducted a vicious counterinsurgency-like campaign as an attempt to 
stomp out any rebellion. The civilians in the north received the brunt of the UPDF’s 
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military action.  During the early 1990’s, UPDF soldiers repeatedly targeted the Acholi 
population because of its ethnic ties to the insurgency movements.155  In 1991, the NRA 
launched the four-month military operation, Operation North.  Though many LRA 
members were killed, the NRA refused to stay in local villages and protect the population 
from any returning LRA. The reprisals against civilians by the LRA number in the 
hundreds as suspected government collaborators were maimed and killed.  Many locals 
felt that the NRA was reluctant to protect them from the insurgency and left them 
vulnerable to attacks.156   The NRA left the population to suffer the consequences of its 
harsh counterinsurgency campaign.  
In 2002, the UPDF launched the next major counterinsurgency operation in the 
north, Operation Iron Fist.  Like Operation North, this major military action did capture 
and kill many LRA soldiers, but civilians suffered tremendously.  During this operation 
like in the past, the UPDF committed atrocities against the civilian population in 
Northern Uganda.   Members of the local Acholi tribe accounted rapes of civilians.  
These abuses only reinforced the distrust between northern Ugandans and the central 
government.157   
Despite the overwhelming military presence and action in Northern Uganda 
during Iron Fist, the operation failed to eradicate the LRA.  Museveni, himself, directed 
the first Iron Fist campaign from a base in the north.  It is estimated that over ten 
thousand UPDF troops were involved in the operation. While, the UPDF was applying 
pressure in the north and in parts of Sudan, Joseph Kony and his senior commanders 
evaded capture, again.  The LRA was able to expand operations to new territories to the 
south to include Lira, Soroti, Apac and Katakwi districts of Uganda.158  Iron Fist failed to 
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defeat the LRA.  During the operation, the UPDF neglected to protect the civilians in the 
north; in fact, the UPDF was responsible for many of the non-combatant deaths that 
occurred.  The UPDF COIN strategy was overly dependent on kinetic operations and 
lacked any emphasis on civilian protection.159  The UPDF approach to COIN operations 
was not successful and did not embody the premise that the population is the center of 
gravity for both the insurgency and counterinsurgency.  
COIN theory accepts that in order to defeat an insurgency, the counterinsurgent 
forces must remove the support of the local population.  By isolating an insurgency, it 
cannot gain access to resources, intelligence, or people. However, the conditions of 
separation between insurgency from population should be made and kept by the 
population.  Forced isolation rarely works.   Mass movements and resettling a population 
is the absolute last resort and is “born out of the counterinsurgent’s weakness.”160  The 
UPDF had limited success using kinetic operations, as the insurgency was able to 
maintain some level of support. The UPDF looked for a method to eliminate those 
support networks.  In an attempt to isolate the LRA from the local population, the 
government of Uganda displaced large numbers of Acholi tribesmen into internally 
displaced personnel (IDP) camps.  As the violence in the north raged on, the number of 
IDPs skyrocketed from 400,000 to 1.2 million from 2002 to 2006.161  The living 
conditions were unimaginable as hundreds of thousands crammed into IDP camps.  The 
UPDF was able to remove large swaths of Acholi and Langi out of their homes; estimates 
have up to 90 percent of the Acholi population were displaced.162   
The choice of the government of Uganda to force its own population in the north 
to resettle as part of its domestic counterinsurgency strategy had negative impacts across 
the board, which would bled over into the post conflict phase.   Though the government’s 
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intent was to physically isolate the Acholi population from the LRA, the IDP camps 
attracted attacks by the LRA and abuses by the UPDF soldiers.  The population in the 
north, felt more than ever, unsafe and neglected by the government.  These feelings 
would resonate throughout the post conflict environment and reconstruction progress 
would be slow to start as a result.  The IDP camps only deepened the mistrust that the 
northern population had towards the central government.  The government’s use of CMO 
was to remove the civilians from the battlefield.  In theory, this should have isolated the 
insurgency and at the same time protected civilians from reprisals.  This was not the case 
with the UPDF. Support for the LRA was already declining when UPDF began to strictly 
enforce the resettlements, meaning the civilian population had already begun disengaging 
with the LRA. The civilians in the north required protection from the LRA’s forced 
recruitments and vicious raids instead of the harsh conditions of the IDP camps.    
The IDP camps did not achieve the goal of eliminating civilian exposure to the 
LRA; those living in IDP camps were vulnerable to attacks by the LRA.  Many women 
were raped and mutilated by the LRA when they went to fetch water outside of the camp.  
One father recounts how his daughter was ambushed in broad daylight outside of a camp 
in Gulu. The LRA cut off her lips and ears. “They told her to go back to the UPDF and 
say the LRA is waiting.”163   The IDP camps did not successfully isolate the civilians 
from the LRA influence, nor did they prevent the LRA from recruiting from the civilian 
population, either.  The civilians had to leave the confines to gather food, water and other 
supplies not available inside the camps.  The civilians were not protected by the UPDF 
when they left the camps; the LRA soldiers simply waited for the civilians to leave camp 
in order to assault them.  
Not only did the IDP camps fail to achieve the intended goals, the strategy bred 
contempt for both the government and the UPDF as institutions. Life in the IDP camps 
was hard, full of fear, hunger and overcrowding.  Jan Egeland, the UN chief humanitarian 
officer, said, “northern Uganda must be one of the worst humanitarian crises in the 
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world.”164 There were reports that those attempting to leave the camps were beaten by 
the UPDF.  Human rights violations inside the IDP camps continued, and the population 
was stuck between the horrors of the LRA at home or the brutality of the UPDF in the 
camps.  Not only were the camps unsuccessful as a part of the UPDF COIN strategy, it 
also created huge problems in the post conflict phase as millions attempted to return back 
to their homes.  The decision of the government to use COIN tactics that are considered 
to be the last resort on its own population proved to be unsuccessful.   In the case of the 
forced resettlement, applying COIN strategies typically reserved for a third-party nation 
on a domestic population bred mistrust and sowed the seeds of the core grievances 
towards the central government even further.  After years of physically removing people 
from their homes and neglecting to protect them from the LRA, the UPDF was looked 
upon as tool of oppression by the Museveni government.  The UPDF would have to 
repair that reputation in order to rebuild the north.  The methods the UPDF used to 
provide damage control from the fallout of domestic COIN operations will be discussed 
in the next chapter.  
For over twenty years, the UPDF and government of Uganda conducted heavy-
handed counterinsurgency operations on its own soil.  The UPDF was not professional 
enough to handle its own population, suffering from a lack in training and coordination. 
The UPDF’s use of COIN tactics alienated the population.   While the population did not 
out rightly support Kony and his violence, it did not trust the Museveni government or its 
military.165  In March 2004, Human Rights Watch reported that the UPDF had 
committed repeated human rights abuses to include rape, mutilation of male genitalia and 
other forms of torture.166  The UPDF had to change its policy and engage the population 
in order to truly defeat the insurgency.   
   The army realized that not only did the reputation of the UPDF need repair, but 
the entire government.  Using CMO in the north, could not only function as 
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reconstruction efforts, but also possibly build a relationship between the north and the 
central government through a series of good public relations (PR). Through an integrated 
CMO strategy in the north, the government saw the ability rehabilitate its reputation as 
well as limit any remnants of support for the LRA.  By the time the LRA moved to 
Southern Sudan, the UPDF knowing that its reputation as unprofessional was detrimental 
to success began to institute reforms. The UPDF began to conduct human rights training 
for its forces, increasing pay and benefits, and other measures to professionalize its force 
and repair its reputation.  Human rights violators were brought to justice.167   The UPDF 
began to focus on the non-kinetic CMO activities and training for its soldiers.  These 
reforms were key to post conflict operations as the UPDF transitioned from operating in a 
combat zone to conducting stability and reconstruction operations in Northern Uganda.  
Also, using these CMO tactics domestically, the UPDF obtained approval from the local 
population and limit LRA sympathizers within the population.  The following chapter 
will examine those CMO programs and determine if the UPDF achieved those objectives.   
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V.  CMO IN UGANDA 
A.  NORTHERN UGANDA’S POST CONFLICT ERA 
COIN doctrine is based on the idea that the population is the center of gravity.  
Both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency require support from the local population 
to achieve their ultimate endstates.   The previous chapter illustrated how both the LRA 
and UPDF sought to influence the population through violence and coercion rather than 
using non-kinetic measures to secure support. As the conflict evolved, the UPDF 
implemented counterinsurgency strategies such as forced relocations and intense combat 
operations to overwhelm the LRA.  The UPDF’s extremely forceful techniques further 
alienated the northern population from a government by which they already felt 
marginalized.   The UPDF used harsh methods to isolate the LRA, but neglected to 
protect the population or attempt to “win the hearts and minds” through non-military 
action. Both sides failed to gain popular support in the north.  After twenty years of 
conflict, the LRA could no longer maintain an operational base in Uganda; however, the 
organization was able to survive and poses a continued threat to the security of Northern 
Uganda and other countries in the region. The post conflict environment left the 
Government of Uganda challenged with integrating a dejected northern population back 
into the national scene.  Through a series of training, education and shifting its doctrine, 
the UPDF began to adopt CMO concepts from the United States and other western 
militaries.  The UPDF implemented these CMO and COIN concepts within its own 
territory of Northern Uganda.  The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the CMO 
activities in Northern Uganda and determine if adopting CMO concepts like those found 
in Joint Publication 3–57 Civil-Military Operations can be effectively used by a military 
on its own population in the post conflict environment.  
 The cessation of outright combat did not mean that total peace had been 
achieved, however. The post conflict landscape in Northern Uganda was volatile and 
unstable with over 1.6 million IDPs residing in 218 official camps and several unplanned 
 64 
camps.168  The operational environment was filled with challenges for every organization 
involved in the post conflict recovery, including the UPDF. Aside from rebuilding a war-
torn north, the UPDF had to overcome several major issues distinct to the army to include 
the fact that it was operating within its own country’s borders.   
One major obstacle the military faced was improving its public relations (PR) 
with a despondent population. More than anything, CMO activities and projects 
presented an opportunity for the Government of Uganda to improve its reputation with its 
own population by effectively using the UPDF.  Abuses, human rights violations and the 
unwillingness to protect civilians had all eroded the confidence of the population towards 
the army. Through its history as the NRA led by president Museveni, the UPDF is 
directly linked to the central government.  The marginalization and abuses by the UPDF 
only fueled the core grievances against the government as a whole, from which the 
original conflict had emerged.  This chapter will show that the UPDF was able to achieve 
goals of assisting in the reconstruction and positively influencing the population using 
CMO as its primary tool.   
The UPDF is just one of many players conducting reconstruction operations in the 
north. It is imperative to examine the whole picture of the reconstruction strategy before 
assessing the UPDF’s impact.  This chapter will first review the overall reconstruction 
efforts in the north.  The next section will outline how the UPDF transitioned its 
organization through training and education in order to implement CMO.  Projects and 
actual efforts conducted by the UPDF will be examined to establish if they were able to 
achieve their intended purposes.  Finally, this study will determine the indicators of 
successful CMO in Northern Uganda. Through these assessments, one can deduce that 
UPDF’s application of CMO simultaneously enhanced the reconstruction efforts in 
Northern Uganda and the UPDF’s image.  
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B.  RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTHERN UGANDA 
Northern Uganda’s reconstruction efforts began immediately following the 
departure of the LRA. The government, NGOs, and the international community all 
gravitated to the crisis in Uganda and developed individual plans to rebuild the north. 
However, the massive influx of actors from across the globe made a comprehensive 
reconstruction strategy impossible.   Many organizations and NGOs acted unilaterally to 
achieve their specific goals. Despite the complications of developing a single strategy, 
reconstruction programs and projects commenced.  This section will outline several of 
the major reconstruction challenges presented in Northern Uganda and analyze the efforts 
conducted by the Government of Uganda and international donors to address those 
challenges.   
1.  The Effects of Reintegration 
The post-conflict environment in Northern Uganda contended with hundreds of 
thousands of IDPs returning home, wrecked or non-existent infrastructure, and a massive 
influx of aid.   In addition to these complex issues, the population of the north also had to 
deal with LRA soldiers returning home and seeking reconciliation.  The Government of 
Uganda needed to develop a systematic way to reintegrate these members back into 
society.  Bringing ex-LRA soldiers back into the fold was an emotional and difficult 
process.  Most of the LRA fighters were Acholi as were the majority of LRA victims, 
which led to difficulties in the process. Because of the involvement of Acholi as both 
perpetrators and victims, the atonement process had to include Acholi culture and 
tradition to for the ex-fighters to be cleansed in minds of the population and the former 
LRA soldiers.  To appease both the legal and spiritual aspects of the situation, the 
reconciliation process included both the Acholi ritual aspect and government-
administered justice.169  According to interviews with the local population, most 
Northern Ugandans were willing to welcome back LRA fighters because they were 
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viewed as children.  Reconciliation of ex-LRA fighters remained instrumental to the post 
conflict environment and necessary for the forward momentum of Northern Uganda.   
2.  Coordinating Efforts in a Flood of International Aid 
Once the LRA left Uganda, the environment opened up for aid workers to flood 
the scene; however, these international donors did not coordinate their efforts. Some 
NGOs and donors were actually competing amongst each other for projects and funds. 
The large number of donors and infighting made a synchronized reconstruction effort 
almost impossible.170  The European Commission’s (EC) quarterly report on Uganda 
stated that both the EC and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA) had attempted mapping and harmonizing efforts, but the lack of information 
sharing and consolidation caused a plethora of problems for donors.171  With the gap in 
information and coordination, both the EC and the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund 
(NUSAF) reported large amounts of money were unaccounted for due to corruption.172  
Money intended for small community projects had not made it to the end users, leaving 
Northern Ugandans despondent.  
Other international donors and programs began to take shape in 2006 once the 
LRA’s physical threat dissipated.  UNOCHA began to transition from an emergency 
relief to focusing on development.173  The World Bank implemented the NUSAF; a 
program designed to empower communities in Northern Uganda by “enhancing their 
capacity to systematically identify, prioritize, and plan for their needs and implement 
sustainable development initiatives that improve socio-economic services and 
opportunities.”174  In the past five years, NUSAF has funded the development of major 
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infrastructure projects to include roads and hydro-power stations in the north.  Also, the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) established a USG Gulu Branch in 
June 2006.175  Donors, NGOs and money began pouring into the north, but not all of the 
funds made it to the intended location.  
3.  Domestic Issues within Reconstruction 
The first indication that Northern Uganda had entered into the post conflict phase 
was the government’s participation in peace negotiations with the LRA in Juba.  The 
peace talks eventually failed due for two reasons.  First, neither side actually ended 
combat operations.  While peace talks were underway, the UPDF launched a massive 
offensive, Operation Lighting Thunder, in the DRC section of Garamba National Park to 
hunt and kill Joseph Kony.  The operation resulted in retaliation by the LRA in which 
they assaulted villages in the DRC, reportedly raping over 200 civilians.176   Second, the 
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictments against Joseph Kony for human rights 
abuses left the LRA feeling cornered by the international community.  The peace talks 
fell apart in 2008 when Joseph Kony refused to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA), 
stating that he would rather die in the bush than turn himself in to the ICC or the 
Government of Uganda.177  
Though the peace talks were a stalling tactic for the LRA in order to orchestrate 
their escape to neighboring countries, the north embarked on the road to reconstruction in 
the wake of hostilities.  The Government of Uganda and the international community 
turned their attention to post conflict activities. In 2007, the Government of Uganda 
initiated the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP).  The intent of the program 
was to stabilize the north through peace, recovery and development, as it was so 
adequately named.  The plan outlined four strategic objectives: “consolidation of state 
authority; peace-building and reconciliation; rebuilding and empowering communities; 
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and rebuilding the economy of Northern Uganda.”178 The program was originally 
designed to be a three-year program with a $609M budget, 70 percent provided by donors 
and the Government of Uganda would fund the remaining 30 percent.   The PRDP 
primarily focused on the technical aspects of rebuilding central and local government 
institutions, improving services, and revitalizing the economy.179 The Norwegian Agency 
for Development’s appraisal of the program noted that in the areas of empowering the 
community, districts and sub-counties developed innovative approaches to use the 
conditional grants provided by the program.  Local governments were able to create 
budgets and district level expenditures.  At the same time, these local actors were 
constrained by their lack of capacity to implement larger programs and typically kept 
expenditures small.  Success was on a district-to-district basis; the larger more developed 
districts were able to implement the PRDP with more ease than the lesser-developed 
districts with smaller staffs.180 
The limited success of the PRDP was a result of low local capacity, 
embezzlement at national and provincial levels and the diversion of funds for political 
ends particularly around the February 2011 elections.181  Initially, there were 
disagreements about which districts in the north should receive PRDP funds.  There were 
also concerns that politicians were abusing funds for their own benefit.  And finally, no 
consensus was reached on how to manage the funds.  Though $609 million seems to be a 
large amount of money, the sum is small in terms of economic development 
programming, especially taking into account that the conflict had lasted over twenty-
years.182  In 2009, the Government of Uganda could not uphold its 30 percent 
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commitment to the PRDP as it had succumbed to the ebb of economic tides.183  The 
deferral outraged the citizens of the north and the international community, so much that 
the United Kingdom temporarily threatened to makes its own contribution conditionally 
based.184  The PRDP made a small impact on the development of Northern Uganda, 
despite its financial and managerial troubles.  Even with the PRDP progress, the region 
still lagged behind the rest of Uganda.  
The post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Northern Uganda have been complex.  
The reintegration of returning ex-LRA soldiers challenged the government’s ability to 
reconcile the northern population.  The Government of Uganda, donors, civil society, ex-
LRA fighters and the international community all were faced with the difficulties of 
coordination, information sharing, and bringing Northern Uganda up to par with the rest 
of the country.  The next section will outline how the UPDF has been key to assisting in 
Northern Uganda’s reconstruction.  
C.   THE UPDF SHIFT TO CMO 
Moving into a post-conflict phase, the UPDF was not an organization with a 
history of partnering with civil society.  The UPDF’s status in Northern Uganda prior to 
2006 waffled between being heavy-handed and overly ambivalent.  After years of abuse, 
human rights violations and lack of protection, the population in the north had no reason 
to trust the UPDF or the central government.  This lack of trust had to be addressed in 
order for the country to move forward as a whole. Not only did the UPDF need an 
adjustment on how it engaged civilians, it needed a total makeover in the eyes of the 
public. The UPDF’s post conflict CMO objects were two fold, improve the UPDF’s 
public image and at the same time assist in the overall stability and reconstruction efforts 
taking place in Northern Uganda. In order to achieve these goals the UPDF underwent 
dramatic internal changes.  As an organization and as individual soldiers, the UPDF 
embarked on several training programs to enhance the ability of the army to engage with 
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civilians.  Through training and re-shaping the mindset of its soldiers, the UPDF emerged 
as experts on civil military operations.185  This section will show how the UPDF used 
training and education to accomplish an organizational shift towards non-kinetic 
operations and CMO in the post conflict environment.  
1.  Internal directives 
In order to recast the mindset of the UPDF, soldiers and commanders alike 
required a new lens to view how it treated the population.  In May of 2006, the UPDF in 
cooperation with the ICRC completed its first “Train of the Trainers Course” on the Law 
of Armed Conflict International Humanitarian Law (IHL).  This program produced IHL 
instructors internal to the UPDF.  The UPDF also signed three military directives for 
future IHL initiatives. The first directive ensured that soldiers at the lowest levels 
received proper training on international humanitarian law. The second directive focused 
on the quality of training amongst senior leadership and within the UPDF professional 
education programs.  And the third directive was a working plan to implement a 
Memorandum of Cooperation between the UPDF and ICRC.186    
Within two years of these directives, the UPDF signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with the ICRC stating that the UPDF would formally integrate 
international humanitarian law within its military doctrine, training, and operations.  The 
MOU meant the continuation of the “train the trainer” course, graduating approximately 
twenty-five UPDF instructors and legal officers per session.  By continuing the course, 
the UPDF could sustain the training without international assistance.  Within a month of 
signing the MOU, over 500 UPDF soldiers had received training along with members of 
the general public and administrators in the Northern District of Gulu.187   Even though it 
took two years for the intended ICRC training to trickle down to the end users in the 
north, training and education were occurring at all levels within the UPDF.   
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Along with basic human rights training the UPDF  launched new CMO programs 
to educate general forces on the salience of civil-military relations.  President Museveni, 
also the most senior ranking officer in the UPDF, emphasized the building of civil-
military capacity.  While addressing a group of soldiers in 2006, he pointed out that the 
UPDF needed to treat civilians with respect.  Museveni used an analogy based on a quote 
by the revolutionary leader in China, Mao tse Tung, which states, “The Army of the 
people must be like fish in the water.  Without the water, the fish would die.” The quote 
emphasizes the need for support from the population for the army.  President Museveni 
focused on that same concept of developing a strategic relationship with the people of 
Uganda, by directing his soldiers, “You cannot be like a fish in the water when [you] are 
stealing from people [and while] you are barking at people because you are soldiers. You 
should reinforce discipline [among yourselves].”188  The civil-military dynamic was an 
important aspect to the central government’s plan in the north. 
2.  Partnered Forces  
The UPDF has received training from various partnered militaries to improve its 
civil-military relations.  In 2007, the Canadian government trained UPDF soldiers in 
Pease Support Operations (PSO).  One major tenet of the training was Military-Civilian 
Cooperation.  The mantra that the civilians should lead these efforts appeared in this 
evolution as one soldier quoted, “Cooperating with locals in the peace mission is a must. 
You are working from them. They are your masters.” 189  The concept that the civilians 
are the “masters” was new compared to how the UPDF operated in the past.  The idea of 
integrating of civilian and military national assets to achieve and maintain peace appeared 
in various UPDF articles and interviews during this time.  In 2009, educational articles on 
the functionality of Civil Affairs appeared in the Tarehe Sita, the UPDF’s professional 
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military publication.  The article specifically alluded to U.S. Civil Affairs and UN CIMIC 
doctrine to elaborate on the overall role of CMO within operations.190    
In 2010, the United States sponsored CMO training for 160 UPDF soldiers.  The 
training lasted two weeks and was integrated into a full spectrum operations exercise.191  
MAJ Jesus Rodriguez, U.S. Army, states in an interview “The U.S. did not open the 
UPDF’s eyes to CMO.  They understood the concept; it was already integrated into how 
they operate.  We were there to show them some of our best practices and teach them 
[tactics, techniques and procedures] that we had garnished from Iraq and 
Afghanistan.”192   By providing training to its soldiers the UPDF displayed a 
commitment to integrating CMO into its overall operations.  The human rights training 
and incorporation of basic CMO doctrine enhanced the UPDF’s ability to conduct post 
conflict operations in the north and at the same time has improved the reputation of the 
UPDF among the general population.  The next section will review various CMO 
activities the UPDF has executed in the north and determine the impact of those 
operations.  
D.  EVALUATION OF UPDF CMO ACTIVITIES 
The UPDF’s application of CMO principles on its own territory resulted in the 
increased approval ratings of the military and central government over the past five years 
in Northern Uganda.  The European Commission reported, “The UPDF became one core 
partner in civil military co-operation interventions together with Civil Society and Local 
Government actors.  The intervention has increased the confidence between the UPDF 
and civil society towards restoring law and order.”193   The UPDF displayed its ability to 
bring in assets of national power and international donors to achieve post conflict 
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stability in the north.  The UPDF’s CMO activities in Northern Uganda were not just 
limited to random or small impact projects; they covered the full spectrum of civil 
military operations.  The success of the full range of CMO activities has increased the 
UPDF’s standings among the population in the north.  
1.  Specific Projects and Programs 
The UPDF directly assisted in the reconstruction efforts in Northern Uganda 
through its comprehensive use of the principles of CMO.  In order to assist in the 
restoration of civil order, a combination of both police and military forces deployed to the 
north.  The Instrument for Stability intervention is a UPDF led initiative, which was 
aimed at promoting peace and security.194  The ultimate goal is to transition the north 
back to civil authorities and move the UPDF to more traditional military roles.  Through 
this initiative, the UPDF provided train the trainer courses for the Child- Family 
Protection Police units in order to strengthen these units’ capabilities.195 The Child-
Family Protection Police focus on domestic issues within the population, such as child 
abuse or domestic violence.  Joint training with law enforcement and increasing police 
capacity, allowed the UPDF to step back from policing roles. As early as 2006, the UPDF 
began to turn over law enforcement responsibilities to the Ugandan Police as well as 
conducting joint operations to ensure a smooth transition to civil authority.196  The 
coordinated training with the police force showed the people of Northern Uganda that the 
UPDF was ready to relinquish its past role as an internal policing unit.  Those past 
policing roles have been associated with the barrage of human rights violations that 
plagued the UPDF’s reputation.  By turning over the rule of law back to civil authorities, 
the UPDF made the statement that it was a different army than it was twenty years ago.  
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In 2008, the UPDF opened four Civil Military Coordination Centers (CMCCs) in 
the northern region of Karamoja. The purpose of a CMCC is a single location where 
civilians and the military can coordinate reconstruction efforts.  The CMCC’s objective is 
to integrate civil partners, police, and the UPDF to undertake community level civil-
military work and jointly address security needs.197  The CMCCs are not only functional 
in coordinating relief and development activities but act as visible symbols of the military 
and government’s commitment to local communities down to the sub-district level.  The 
CMCCs are physical evidence that the UPDF became central to reconstruction 
coordination.  These centers served as public announcements that the UPDF was going to 
be involved in the reconstruction process for the long-term.  
Along with integration and training, the UPDF has also been involved in a 
multitude of projects, from small impact to large infrastructure.  The smaller projects 
include, but are not limited to, the refurbishment of local government buildings and 
schools, medical engagements, veterinary engagements and donations to local 
governments.  Some examples of the smaller level projects include donations to the 
Amuria Hospital and conducting dental treatments for 2000 people and along with 
immunizations.  The UPDF has intentionally focused on areas attacked by the LRA. One 
example is the donation of supplies to a primary school in Teso, an area devastated by the 
LRA.198  By paying specific attention to areas that were targeted by the LRA, the UPDF 
is able to show the population that they are not the enemy.  The projects emphasize the 
message that the LRA has left and what they stood for is gone; however, the UPDF and 
national government remain and will help rebuild the lives ruined by the war.  Though 
these particular projects are small in nature, the purpose is designed to communicate 
something much deeper than simple donations and vaccinations- it is meant to build a 
rapport  between the government and the people of Northern Uganda.   
The UPDF has used CMO efforts in conjunction with combined or joint military 
exercises in the north. For instance, as a culminating event in 2009’s combined exercise, 
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Natural Fire 10, the UPDF led a massive medical engagement in Kitgum, where over 
11,600 patients were treated.199  During that same exercise, an engineering unit 
rehabilitated a dining facility and a classroom for a local school as well as a church.200  
After a CMO training exercise in 2010, UPDF soldiers refurbished several buildings to 
hone their new skill sets. UPDF engineers have also conducted road repairs and 
improvements on roads that lead to district headquarters, assisting in the promotion of 
commerce as a part of their own military training.201   
The Government of Uganda has deliberately selected cities in Northern Uganda, 
such as Gulu and Kitgum, as the sites for these major combined exercises with the United 
States and neighboring African countries.  Bringing in militaries from multiple countries 
can generate capital for the selected locations and as well as good publicity for the UPDF. 
The potential for local economies to surge from the influx of military units exists as 
thousands of soldiers pour into the area for the exercise.   In return, this can affect the 
standing of the army with local merchants.  At the same time, the UPDF is conducting 
medical engagements and school refurbishments to access and influence the rest of the 
population.202  Again, using small but highly visible projects the UPDF is capitalizing on 
CMO to enhance its public image.  The UPDF is able to deliver aid to communities in the 
north; promoting the idea that the government can deliver to the population.  
Demining is another CMO project, unique to the UPDF’s capabilities. The 
demining and sweeping for unexploded ordinances (UXO) is an inherent military task 
that the UPDF is able to apply as it assists civilians who are adjusting to the post conflict 
environment. IDPs in the north have expressed fear in returning home due to landmines. 
The UPDF is able to specifically address the concerns of those citizens by clearing large 
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tracts of land for resettlement. Since 2006, the UPDF has uncovered 15,214 UXO and 
over twenty landmines.203/204 Conducting demining operations makes a statement to the 
local population that UPDF soldiers are willing to risk their own lives to clear the areas of 
possible UXOs.  These types of operations counter past notions that the UPDF and 
central government do not care about the people in the north. Not only does the CMO 
activity remove the potential threats for the local population and create a secure 
environment for people to cultivate land; it resonates the strategic message to the 
population that the government will keep them safe.   
The UPDF instituted a region-wide “cash for work” program as an integrated 
effort to disarm individuals in the northern region. This CMO program was a part of a 
greater security strategy specific to the large amount of cattle raiders who surfaced from 
the Karamoja Region, west of Acholiland.   As a result of years of battling the LRA, 
areas in the north have been ignored by the central government as it focused solely on the 
Acholi problem.  The Karamoja region has a history of cattle raiding, but without the 
Government of Uganda’s presence and control the number of cattle raiders and outlaws 
skyrocketed.  The bandits, who had been armed with bows and arrows in the past, were 
able to acquire small arms and automatic weapons because of the war.  The Karamoja 
Region became a haven for cattle raiders and armed men after years of government 
neglect.  The Karamoja outlaws posed a viable security threat to rebuilding the north.205  
Since the LRA has left Uganda, the UPDF was able to turn its attention to the 
disarmament campaign in Karamoja.  This campaign used both kinetic and non-kinetic 
operations to bring the rule of law back to the region.  In conjunction with its security 
patrols in Karamoja, the UPDF also began implementing a “cash for work” program to 
dissuade the youth from joining cattle raiders.  The “cash for work” is a classic CMO 
tool, to take fighters off the streets and give them a steady income.  The UPDF’s choice 
of the “cash for work” program in conjunction with active patrols and raids on weapons 
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caches sends a distinct message to the north.  First, the cash for work program gives 
criminals a viable alternative to banditry and the option to make money legitimately.  The 
second message comes from the kinetic action, which indicates to the outlaws- if you do 
not give up your weapons to the UPDF, they will come and take them from you 
physically.   The “cash for work program” synchronized both kinetic principles with non-
kinetic means to bring more stability in the Karamoja Region.  By containing the security 
threat in Karamoja, the UPDF provided an environment in which the other northern 
districts could focus on rebuilding.  
  Other UPDF CMO projects focus on larger strategic impacts.  Though these 
projects do not specifically address the north, they still affect reconstruction and 
economic development in that region.  For example in 2010, the UPDF engineers began 
assessments to assist in the rebuilding of the Ugandan railways.  This project has massive 
implications for economic development for the entire country.206  Improving the rails 
system could increase nationwide commerce, which would eventually trickle to the 
northern region.  The repairs of the Ugandan railways have the potential to symbolize 
both the capacity and might of not just the UPDF, but Uganda as a whole.  Though 
construction efforts have not commenced, the railway project illustrates how the UPDF 
implements CMO in its own territory.  The UPDF projects are not only chosen to serve a 
functional purpose in reconstruction efforts, but also produce prominent symbols of the 
state to displays its good will to the public.  
The UPDF represented by the CMCCs functions as a central point of coordination 
for development activities in the north.  With the issues of disjointed international aid and 
lack of civil authority in the north, the UPDF has been able to bring together the 
important players in development and get results. The UPDF has established CMCCs at 
both district and sub-district levels to promote good civil-military relations.207  The 
European Commission and other development partners have recognized the importance 
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of the UPDF’s role as a partner in the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The European 
Commission has gone so far as to credit the UPDF as a central player in the 
reconstruction of the north.208  The UPDF has managed a major transformation in civil-
military relations over the past five years. Through training, operations, and coordination, 
the UPDF has emerged as an important player in the reconstruction and development of 
the north.  According to UPDF officials, the reputation and approval of the army has 
improved tremendously since 2006.  The implementation of CMO principles has 
improved the UPDF’s reputation among the population and has been instrumental in the 
overall reconstruction of Northern Uganda.   
2. Indicators of success 
The reconstruction efforts and CMO projects in the north are ongoing and the true 
measures of success may not be seen for years to come.  However, one can gage the 
immediate impacts the UPDF is having on the north by studying specific trends that 
emerge from the region.  The UPDF’s role in post conflict is tied to the overall 
reconstruction and development of Northern Uganda.  Indicators of recovery can be 
measured in economic growth.   The UPDF’s primary function in the north is to provide 
security in the region in order for development to occur.   By examining the perception of 
improved security, one can determine whether or not the UPDF is able to provide 
security and at the same time convince the population that the UPDF and the government 
will continue to protect them.  A major tenant in the UPDF’s CMO activities is to regain 
public trust in both its army and the government.  By examining public opinion polls 
from the north about perceptions and approval of the government, one can determine the 
success of this CMO objective to a degree.  Public opinion data is based on many factors 
outside of the UPDF, but an upward trend in government approval indicates that public 
relations are improving.  This next section will look at indicators in economic growth, 
improved security, and public opinion to determine the salience of the UPDF’s CMO 
campaign in Northern Uganda.  
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a. Economic Growth 
A major concern for those involved in the recovery efforts was the ability 
for returnees from IDP camps to resettle and reactivate the economy.  With over 90 
percent of the Acholi population force to relocate and abandon their livelihood, the 
economy in Northern Uganda prior to 2006 looked grim.  By 2007, the economic outlook 
began to change as more individuals returned to their homes.   In a study funded by the 
Norwegian embassy in Kampala, returnees had begun to reengage in economic activities 
such as cultivating land and herding.209   Though the study did not measure the impact of 
returnees to the northern economy, it displayed an upward trend in livelihood activities. 
These activities directly translate to an increase in commerce and market places, which 
eventually spur economic growth.  
The World Bank projected an increase in agriculture production in the 
north as a result of both returnees engaging in farming and raising livestock.210  This 
assertion is supported by the 2010 statistics provided by the Ugandan Bureau of 
Statistics.  The 2008 livestock census shows that the northern region had the biggest 
share cattle and goats with 34.3 percent of the nation’s cattle and 37.4 percent of the 
nation’s goats.  These numbers were projected to grow at three percent in 2009.211  These 
statistics illustrate that the economic space is opening up for more opportunities in 
agriculture, which can lead to potential economic growth overall.  The increase of 
livestock in the economic sector is positive and can be tied back to the reconstruction 
efforts.  
With the increase in returnees and development of the agriculture in the 
north, the economy continues to grow and with that growth comes improvements in 
quality of life.    The World Bank in its 2010 report asserts that the reconstruction efforts 
have increased the livelihoods among forty‐seven percent of the population in northern 
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Uganda, against a target of thirty percent.  These programs have improved access to 
social services through NUSAF.212   The economy in Northern Uganda is slowly taking 
off and with that the lives of those living in the north are improving.   
The number of Northern Ugandans who live below the poverty line is still 
extraordinarily high, despite poverty reduction efforts with the PRDP and NUSAF.  The 
rate still lingers at over 60 percent of the population living in poverty. There have been 
minimal decreases in the poverty rate since 2005.  The poverty reduction programs are 
still working in conjunction with those designed to stimulate economic growth.  The full 
extent of the reconstruction effects on the economy in Northern Uganda remains to be 
seen, as it has only been five years since the LRA left Uganda.  But the positive growth in 
agriculture and working returnees indicates intermediate success on the road towards 
long-term development.   
b.  Improved Security 
Improvements in the security situation on the ground and local perceptions 
about the ability to work and live free of danger are also measures of the UPDF’s 
success.  The security aspect is unique to the UPDF compared to its development 
partners, because the army is charged with protecting the population.  This means 
protecting the population from armed groups, landmines and other dangers that threaten 
the environment for development to occur.213   Improved security not only affects the 
ability for the northern population to function as a society, but it also increases the 
UPDF’s clout amongst the populous for providing safety.  
The population in Northern Uganda has seen an increase in stability and 
security since 2006.  The 2011 Afrobarometer, a public opinion survey, showed that 66 
percent of Northern Ugandans polled felt that the government was doing a good job 
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providing safety from crime and violence.214  Another public opinion survey concludes 
that not only are Northern Ugandans safer than in 2006, but they also feel safer. 215   
These surveys illustrate that the incidences of violence has decreased significantly.  
Individuals feel freer to go to work, collect water or wood, and carry on with their lives.  
Not all those individuals questioned in the Transitioning to Peace survey attributed the 
increased security to the UPDF or the state, but over 65 percent related it to one or the 
other.  Over 75 percent surveyed in the same study felt that the security situation would 
only get better with time.216  These surveys indicate that a large majority of the northern 
population credits the newfound security with the UPDF and the government. This 
displays that the image of the UPDF has transitioned from heavy-handed and oppressive 
to an organization credited with protecting its own population.  The improved security 
and opinions of the northern population are markers to a successful CMO strategy.  
c. Improved Perceptions of National Government 
The goal of the UPDF is to use its success in reconstruction efforts and 
security in the north to rebuild its reputation from the conflict.  For most northerners, the 
UPDF represents the central government as a whole and by improving the UPDF’s 
image; the government itself can increase its approval by the population.  The Transition 
to Peace polling date shows that most Northern Ugandans have limited contact with 
authorities, which means that the UPDF may be the only exposure individuals receive 
from the national government.217 This section will look at the public opinion regarding 
the government as whole a determining factor in whether or not the UPDF’s goals have 
been achieved. 
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A 2010 survey for the upcoming elections showed an increase in voter 
turnout in the north.  In 2006, only 72 percent of northerners voted, where over 93 
intended to vote in the 2011 elections. This is partly because many did not have access to 
voting while in IDPs camps. But only 7 percent of northerners plan to abstain from voting 
indicates that a majority of the population believes in the electoral process, at lease 
enough so to vote.  This increase of involvement illustrates that the population in the 
north believes the process is important and they have a voice in the government.218  
The 2011 Afrobarometer data showed that a significant number of the 
northerners polled approved of Museveni’s performance from 2009–2010.  Less than 20 
percent either strongly disapproved or disapproved of the president, which meant that the 
vast majority of 80 percent were either neutral or positive towards the president’s 
performance. The same poll had results for high approval ratings of the ruling political 
party, the NRM.219  These ratings are evidence that the opinions of the central 
government, through the president and the ruling party, have improved since 2006.  The 
image of Museveni in Northern Uganda has transitioned from a man who’s rise to the 
presidency resulted in three major insurgencies, to a president who has an 80 percent 
approval rating from the north.   The transition of the central government’s image in the 
north has been remarkable considering the undercurrent of core grievances and the 
ethnopolitics that existed in the region.  The UPDF’s transformation in the eyes of the 
public is just as noteworthy.  Though not all of the population approves of the 
government or has moved on from the war, the overwhelming majority is ready to build a 
future within the current political system.  The UPDF has been able to successfully use 
CMO programs and activities to influence the population to this end.  
The UPDF seems to have achieved both of its goals of assisting in the 
overall reconstruction in the north and improving the army’s image.  The impacts from 
small projects to large regional and nationwide initiatives have improved the economic 
                                                 
218 Pham, Phuong and Patrick Vinck. Transitioning to Peace: A Population-Based Survey on 
Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and Justice in Northern Uganda. CA: Human Rights Center 
University of California Berkeley, 2010 (accessed November 10, 2011): 34. 
219 Summary of Results Round 4.5(2) AFROBarometer Pre-Election Survey in Uganda 2011, 2010 
(accessed November 15, 2011): 42.  
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growth in the over arching recovery plan.   By incorporating CMO activities with security 
operations, the UPDF has improved the conditions in the north.  The increased security 
and slow growing economy have correlated with the increased positive perceptions of the 
government as a whole.  Executing CMO campaigns is a relatively quick means to gain 
public buy-in, as the UPDF has been able to pull off this enormous shift in public opinion 
within five years of post conflict operations.   The UPDF has been able to recover its 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
This study began by exploring the relevance of population-centric strategies 
within the post conflict environment and how that relationship related to the salience of 
CMO in COIN, stability operations and HA.  During counterinsurgency operations, both 
insurgents and counterinsurgents struggle for influence over the population.  COIN 
doctrine is based on the concept that gaining the population’s support is key to defeating 
an insurgency.  Once the insurgency is isolated from the population, it cannot gain 
enough traction to force changes upon the state.  Stability Operations are directly linked 
to improving government capacity and providing basic services to a civilian population.  
HA is intended provide relief and emergency aid for either man-made or natural disasters.  
Each of these post conflict operations are affected by the human dynamics that exist in 
each particular environment.  When conducting post conflict operations a military must 
have the means to address the complexity of that human terrain.   Engaging the 
population is a complex military operation all in itself.  A military involved in post war 
operations must be able to influence and access the population in order to increase 
chances of mission accomplishment.    
CMO, defined by U.S. joint doctrine, is designed to achieve specific military 
objectives within a larger military campaign.  The framework outlined by CMO doctrine 
emphasizes that a unity of effort must exist between military and non-military elements, 
but in practice this is not always the case.  Civilians and military actors will always work 
in the same space and have to adapt to each other’s presence.  Though civilian and 
humanitarian components have various goals and missions, these objectives can be 
aligned with a military mission. When those goals do not line up, civilian and military 
actors can at least coexist in the same area of operations.  Training and education 
amongst civilians and military actors alike can increase the likelihood of harmonizing 
goals.  The case study of the UPDF exemplifies that training, especially on the military 
end of the spectrum can increase the chances of CMO synchronizing with civilian 
counterparts in the post conflict environment.   
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The UPDF case study examined how an army can apply the basic principles of 
CMO within its own borders.  CMO theory and doctrine have been primarily developed 
by western nations and applied by armies on foreign soil.  But with the rise of intrastate 
conflicts, the chances that a developing nation will be forced to conduct post conflict 
operations on its own territory are higher than ever.  The UPDF’s actions in Northern 
Uganda proved that an army can use the basic concepts of CMO intended for foreign 
operations on its own population, both assisting in economic recovery and improving 
public perceptions of the government.  
The UPDF’s integration of CMO had two purposes. First, the UPDF directly 
assisted in post conflict reconstruction in Northern Uganda.  By rebuilding the north and 
reintegrating the Acholi population back with the rest of Uganda, the government could 
address core grievances of economic and political marginalization.  Secondly, the UPDF 
had twenty years of poor public image to repair.  CMO proved to be a relatively quick 
way to regain the trust and confidence of the north.   For the government, in particular the 
UPDF, CMO presented a great PR move.  The use of CMO principles within Uganda’s 
own borders resulted increased approval ratings of the UPDF, President Museveni, and 
NRM.  The UPDF managed to recover considerable ground from twenty years of human 
rights violations and abuses towards the north by effectively applying CMO tactics.   
A.  FUTURE IMPLICATIONS  
The possibility of the LRA returning to North Uganda is a distant but real 
possibility and Ugandans considers the continued existence of the LRA a security threat. 
The UPDF has displayed a progressive approach to recovering from the devastation 
caused by the LRA conflict.   As the country continues to recover from the violence 
caused by the war, the UPDF is conducting kinetic operations in neighboring countries to 
hunt and kill Joseph Kony.   The lessons learned from the conflict in Northern Uganda 
should not be forgotten as the UPDF carries on with its counter-LRA mission.  As the 
UPDF sets out to conduct combat operations in CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan, it must 
stay focused on those civilian populations.  The LRA is known for its violent reprisals 
against civilians in the wake of UPDF combat operations.  Protecting the population is an 
essential task; otherwise locals will be less likely to assist the UPDF with intelligence and 
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information on the LRA’s location.  CMO presents a means for the UPDF to gain trust, 
access, and approval from the local populations.   
The regional fight against the LRA continues.   The countries of CAR, South 
Sudan, Uganda, and the DRC have all been affected by the violence and brutality of the 
LRA against their respective populations.  Though each government prioritizes the LRA 
threat relatively low compared their other security problems, all four countries have 
engaged in limited joint operations to eliminate the LRA.220   All of these armies suffer 
from poor human rights records and have dismal reputations of protecting their own 
populations.   Implementing CMO activities in the LRA affected areas can provide relief 
and protection for those populations desperately in need, but more importantly enhance 
the people’s perceptions of  the state’s capacity to provide for them.  CMO can offer the 
PR boost that these governments need in areas where the state is not seen as favorable or 
powerful. 
Uganda’s successful use of CMO in the post conflict environment has future 
implications for other African nations outside of the Great Lakes Region.  Much of the 
African continent has suffered violent intrastate wars within the past fifty years.  In many 
of these states’ the current governments used heavy-handed tactics to control the 
population and defeat their opponents.  Once the war has moved into the post conflict 
phase, the state and its army have to mend their ties with the population.  CMO activities 
are a method in which a government can repair its reputation, while at the same time 
contributing to the rebuilding of a war torn area.   
Though the UPDF was able to recover from its harsh employment of 
counterinsurgent tactics through CMO, a state can avoid the entire repairing process if it 
focuses on gaining popular support during the conflict.  This study asserts that the 
achievements seen in Uganda’s post conflict CMO can be applied during all phases of a 
conflict to include combat operations.  By gaining popular support early, the 
government’s chances of victory are not only greater but can be achieved at a faster rate. 
                                                 
220 International Crisis Group. The Lord’s Resistance Army: End Game? 2011 (18). 
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Including CMO during combat operations, a state will not require as much work during 
the post conflict stages, such as repairing a damaged reputation.   
B.  IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICIES AND ENGAGEMENT 
In May of 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the LRA Disarmament and Northern 
Uganda Recovery Act.  Through this act, the U.S. government is legally bound to support 
the counter-LRA initiatives and contribute to the ongoing recovery in Northern Uganda.  
In October 2011, the United States sent 100 military personnel into Uganda to assist with 
the counter-LRA efforts.  The primary role of the U.S. presence was to assist and advise 
the combat operations conducted by the UPDF and the militaries of the DRC, CAR ,and 
South Sudan.  The U.S. commitment to maintaining the UPDF as a partner in the region 
is evident by the deployment of troops in support of counter-LRA operations.221   
Uganda is a partner with the United States in terms of regional security and the 
Global War on Terrorism.222  The more success Uganda has stabilizing the region 
through its dynamic use of CMO and non-kinetic operations, the more secure U.S. 
interests are in Africa.  As Uganda builds and improves its capacity to conduct CMO, this 
skill set can translate to multiple UPDF operations all over the region, ranging from 
counter-LRA operations to counter-terrorism operations in Somalia.  Thus, building 
Ugandan capacity as a partner is important to the United States.223  Finally, as the United 
States continues to engage in security cooperation and security assistance programs with 
Uganda, studying the UPDF’s goals for CMO can help the U.S. better support, train, 
equip, or advise Ugandan forces to those ends.  
 
                                                 
221 International Crisis Group. The Lord’s Resistance Army: End Game? 2011 (15). 
222 “Leadership and Opportunity in Africa.” http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/president/africa/13.html (accessed November 17, 2011). 
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